Last updated: 2026-11-17
On October 2, 2026, Datatilsynet, Norway's data protection authority, fined Xandr Inc. NOK 92 million in decision 20/03541-37. Datatilsynet found that Xandr processed personal data of Grindr users in Norway in real-time ad auctions without a legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR and without a valid exemption from the Article 9(1) ban on processing data concerning sexual orientation. Datatilsynet announced the fine on October 12, 2026 as equivalent to €8.6 million and "the highest fine it has issued to date". From the update of November 3, 2026: "Xandr has not appealed and the decision is final." Xandr, called AppNexus until 2019, has been part of Microsoft since June 6, 2022 (decision, page 4). Xandr relied on consent collected by Grindr. Datatilsynet had found Grindr's consents invalid in 2021, and found that Xandr, a joint controller with the app, "did not take any measures" to verify that consent was valid (page 37).
What did Datatilsynet find Xandr processed?
Datatilsynet found it "proven by a clear preponderance of probability" that Xandr processed "at least the following personal data about Grindr users": "The fact that they were using Grindr, advertising ID and IP Address" (decision, page 26). The period examined is July 20, 2018, when the GDPR entered into force in Norway, to April 7, 2020, the last day before Grindr deployed a new consent management platform for users in Norway (page 7).
Xandr had two roles in the auctions. As a supply-side platform (SSP), it received ad requests directly from Grindr and offered Grindr's ad space to buyers. As a demand-side platform (DSP), it bid on that ad space, including in auctions run by MoPub, the mediation SDK in the Grindr app at the time, which listed Xandr as an "Advertising Demand Partner" (pages 20 and 21). Xandr told Datatilsynet that it could no longer identify the data it had processed, because the data had been deleted under its retention policies (page 43). Datatilsynet held that Xandr should be able to verify what it had processed, since it had known of the investigation since February 21, 2020. It found it "far more likely than not" that user, device and app fields were processed in ad and bid requests, a processing it described as "standard procedure for such business models at the time" (pages 24 and 25). At a meeting on February 27, 2025, Xandr confirmed that the IP address, the advertising ID and the app URL "would be shared with third-party DSPs"; Xandr later "altered its position" and said it had no evidence of such sharing for Norwegian Grindr users (pages 24 and 25).
Which Grindr requests were sent to Xandr?
The Consumer Council's complaint against AppNexus was based on traffic tests of the Grindr Android app run for the Norwegian Consumer Council by the security company mnemonic between July 8 and December 31, 2019. In the mnemonic technical report, an ad request from the app to ads.mopub.com contains the GPS position, the advertising ID, the bundle com.grindrapp.android and "user_data_q":"m_gender:m,m_age:34". MoPub's response contains a script tag for secure.adnxs.com, and a few seconds later this request is sent from the app (page 25):
GET /ttj?id=15627015&cb=1562584252568&appid=com.grindrapp.android&ip=94.127.56.71&idfa=52d0d5c2-e923-4b1b-bd67-d3b225795edb&psa=0 HTTP/1.1
Host: secure.adnxs.comadnxs.com is AppNexus's ad-serving domain. appid is the app's package name, ip the device's external IP address and idfa the advertising ID. In mnemonic's summary table, the row for AppNexus (Xandr) is "App name, advertising ID, IP address" (page 27). The IP address was absent from the app's request to MoPub and present in MoPub's response (page 26). According to the decision, MoPub documentation stated that the SDK truncated the IP addresses of EU and EEA users, while "the technical testing showed that the MoPub SDK was transmitting the full IP address to Xandr" (decision, pages 21 and 22).
Why is the fact of using Grindr Article 9 data?
Datatilsynet applied its 2021 finding against Grindr: sharing "personal data on a specific user alongside app name or app ID" with advertising partners is processing of data concerning sexual orientation under Article 9(1), because "Data revealing the fact that someone is a Grindr user strongly indicates that they belong to a sexual minority" (page 34). The Privacy Appeals Board, the Oslo District Court and the Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld that finding; the Court of Appeal ruled on October 21, 2025 and kept Grindr's NOK 65 million fine.
Xandr told Datatilsynet that it was not aware of regulatory guidance or market practice treating the mere use of Grindr as special category data, and that the question was settled only by CJEU judgments issued after the period. Datatilsynet found that Xandr's "narrow interpretation of Article 9 appears to have no support in legal sources", cited the CJEU's broad interpretation of Article 9 in cases C-184/20 (OT), C-252/21 (Meta v Bundeskartellamt) and C-21/23 (Lindenapotheke), and noted that "CJEU judgements apply retroactively" (pages 35 and 36). Xandr's contract barred Grindr from sharing special category data; Datatilsynet held that such "a formality in the form of a contractual commitment" does not relieve Xandr when it "de facto processed sensitive personal data" (page 37).
Why did relying on Grindr's consent fail?
Datatilsynet found that Xandr was a joint controller with Grindr "both in its role as SSP and DSP" (page 33), citing the CJEU's IAB Europe judgment of March 7, 2024, C-604/22, paragraph 58: joint controllership "does not require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned". Because the data were special category data, Datatilsynet ruled out Article 9(2)(e) (data manifestly made public by the data subject) and found explicit consent under Article 9(2)(a) the only other possible exception. "It is undisputed that Xandr never obtained any consent directly from the data subjects"; Xandr relied on Grindr to collect it (pages 36 and 37). Grindr's consents had already been found invalid, and Xandr "did not take any measures" to verify that consent was valid and covered its own processing (page 37). From the decision, page 34: "Compliance can never be outsourced."
Line Coll, Director General of Datatilsynet, in the press release: "Our key message is that responsibility for data protection cannot be passed on to others. Each and every company must itself ensure, and be able to document, that they process personal data lawfully."
How was the NOK 92 million fine set?
| Item | Datatilsynet's finding | Decision page |
|---|---|---|
| Amount | NOK 92,000,000; about €8.5 million at the September 15, 2026 rate (the press release gives €8.6 million) | 53 |
| Legal maximum | €20 million (about NOK 215.8 million), because 4% of Xandr's turnover is lower | 52 |
| Turnover basis | Xandr's own revenue for the year July 1, 2024 to June 30, 2025 (amount redacted); Microsoft's turnover not used, because Microsoft did not own Xandr in 2018–2020 | 51, 52 |
| Aggravating | Gravity and duration; special category data; no measures to check Grindr's consents; financial benefit to Xandr | 43, 47, 49 |
| Mitigating | Voluntary attendance at the February 2025 meeting ("slightly mitigating"); the length of the case handling | 47, 49, 53 |
| Users affected | Not established; given no weight | 43 |
| Appeal | Three weeks from receipt; no appeal filed | 54; update of November 3, 2026 |
Source: decision 20/03541-37.
From the press release: "Thousands of users in Norway have been subjected to unlawful sharing". In the decision, that figure concerns Grindr's sharing with third parties; for Xandr, Datatilsynet "does not know how many bid requests related to Grindr users Xandr received or shared" and placed no weight on the number of users (pages 42 and 43).
Datatilsynet decided the case alone. Based on Xandr's answer that its EEA offices were sales offices, Datatilsynet found that Xandr had no main establishment in the EEA during the period, so the GDPR's one-stop-shop cooperation mechanism did not apply; Microsoft's later acquisition did not change that for the 2018–2020 processing (page 16). The decision covers users in Norway only and is "without prejudice to the competence of GDPR supervisory authorities in other EEA territories" (page 17). The CNIL's €7 million Fnac decision is another national decision taken outside the one-stop-shop, under French ePrivacy law.
What did Microsoft say, and what is still open?
A Microsoft spokesperson told BleepingComputer on October 12, 2026 (press) that the investigation "focused on conduct that predates Microsoft's acquisition of Xandr" and that Microsoft was "reviewing the decision and assessing our options". Xandr did not appeal within the three weeks. No later Microsoft statement was found on 2026-11-17.
The Norwegian Consumer Council filed three complaints on January 14, 2020: against Grindr, Twitter's MoPub, AppNexus and OpenX; against Grindr and AdColony; and against Grindr and Smaato (Consumer Council complaints page). Complaints against "four other AdTech companies" are mentioned in the decision against Xandr (page 3). Public decisions against the other ad-tech recipients were not found on 2026-11-17.
In a separate 2026 case, the Citizen Lab found that TCF consent signals for Xandr were processed by the tracking pixel of a spyware vendor's ad platform. That case is covered in the post on Discover-Tech's spyware ads in apps.
What does a capture of a dating app show?
Datatilsynet's findings concern three fields: the package name (which identifies the app), the advertising ID and the IP address. When I capture an app on a test phone, every request is recorded with its host, path, parameters and body. That includes requests sent from an ad SDK's WebView to exchange hosts such as ib.adnxs.com and secure.adnxs.com. Each request is marked as sent before or after the app's consent screen was accepted. The bundle ID, the advertising ID, GPS coordinates, age or gender, where present in a request to a given exchange, are visible in the record next to the consent fields of the same request, such as the TCF string. The network capture method is described on the methodology page.
On Android, a dating app with an ad SDK is a scan finding. When the app is in the Dating category on Google Play and the binary contains an ad SDK, an attribution SDK or Meta App Events, the finding is that use of a dating app can reveal sexual orientation and that the app may be non-compliant in the EU member states, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. A second finding is raised when the manifest also contains the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission. Both are findings of presence in the build; transmission is established only by a capture. In a device capture, the requests from the app to the first exchange are recorded. The server-to-server bid requests that an exchange sends on to DSPs, the subject of Datatilsynet's finding on Xandr's DSP-side sharing, are outside any app capture, as is the 2018–2020 traffic itself (limits). The same split between what an app sends and what happens in the auction is in the post on EFF's study of ad SDKs sending precise location into auctions and the Kochava settlement on location data.
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