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Discover-Tech AdFection: spyware-linked ads in 75,373 apps

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 7 min read

Last updated: 2026-11-17

On October 15, 2026, the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto published "Exposing AdFection", its report on Discover-Tech, an Israeli company that buys online ads. From the report: "We provide the first public technical confirmation of a zero-click mercenary spyware attack delivered via targeted advertising, which we call AdFection." Per the Citizen Lab, devices at Al Jazeera were infected with spyware from Candiru (rebranded "Integrity Labs") through Discover-Tech ads. Ads with the attacker's script tag were shown to users of 75,373 Android and iOS apps between March and June 2026. In Discover-Tech's Controlium platform, a customer can select a target by mobile advertising ID, browser cookie ID or IP address.

What did the Citizen Lab find about Discover-Tech?

The Citizen Lab describes Discover-Tech as a company that "presents itself as a legitimate advertising company, but which we found operates as a facilitator for multiple mercenary spyware partners." Discover-Tech bought ads through its own demand-side platform, MyDSP, which per the report "interfaces with online ad vendors including Google, Yandex, Vungle (Liftoff), and Sunteng," and separately through Eskimi and Comcast's Beeswax (FreeWheel).

In 2024 and 2025, at least 45 devices at Al Jazeera were targeted in zero-click attacks that the Citizen Lab links "with high confidence" to Candiru spyware delivered through Discover-Tech ads. In network logs supplied by Al Jazeera, infected devices contacted Discover-Tech domains (an ad impression), then a Candiru validator server, then a Candiru command-and-control server. The one spyware sample in the report, isolated by Al Jazeera from one compromised device, is a Windows DLL; the device types of the 45 targeted devices are not stated in the report. The mobile-app evidence in the report is ad delivery; an infection of a phone through an app ad is outside that evidence.

Discover-Tech and Candiru (Integrity Labs) did not respond to the Citizen Lab's requests for comment before its deadline, per the report.

How is spyware delivered through a targeted ad?

A Discover-Tech ad contains a script tag that points to what the company calls a "NOAS server". When the ad is rendered in an app or a browser, the advertising identifier of the user (a cookie ID or a mobile advertising ID) is submitted to that server, and any JavaScript in the response is executed. From section 1 of the report: "The NOAS server decides, apparently based on a combination of the source IP address and the advertising identifiers, whether the target is eligible to receive any JavaScript. If so, then code is returned. If not, a 0-byte response is returned."

The Citizen Lab elicited code from a NOAS server with a dummy identifier. The request was https://pqv2.mtrtb[.]com/getAd?idfa=test2, and the response was JavaScript that adds a 1x1 pixel iframe pointing to logger.powerium.net/register_event. The Citizen Lab believes that the NOAS server is "generally, tasked to return some JavaScript exactly once" to specific mobile ad ID or cookie ID values, and that "subsequent visits return nothing until re-tasking." For a user who is not selected, the ad "will still gather data from the user's browser and submit it back to Discover-Tech," which per the report can include cookies set on the page that shows the ad and the device's public IPv6 address.

In the MyDSP bidding records, at least 718,748,885 bids, about 19%, were for ads that contained a NOAS script tag.

How are targets selected by mobile advertising ID in Controlium?

Controlium is Discover-Tech's platform for selecting targets; the Citizen Lab obtained its full frontend source code from its public login page. From section 3: "Customers can use Controlium to select a user for infection or profiling based on their mobile advertising identifier (iOS or Android), browser identifier (MyDSP or Beeswax cookie ID), and/or IP address."

In two Controlium modules, a customer can upload lists of identifiers, including Android and Apple advertising IDs, and attach them to a "segment". In a "Bid Requests" module, recent bid requests for one target identifier or IP address are shown with "user IDs, the website visited or app used by the user, the IP address of the user's device and other attributes." An admin can restrict a customer's campaigns to an "Apps Whitelist" and to listed countries.

Per the report's introduction, an app or site that shows ads contains code from a supply-side platform that "collects and shares granular information about the user and their device with ad exchanges to solicit bids," and that information "can include device identifiers and characteristics, precise location, and IP address data." In a mobile app, that code is the ad SDK. From the same section: "The auction system is designed to enable targeting single individuals based on their mobile advertising ID, cookie ID, IP address, and other identifiers." Bid request contents set by ad SDKs are the subject of EFF's study of four Android ad SDKs that share precise location for ad targeting by default.

Which apps displayed the Discover-Tech ads?

Per section 5 of the report, ads with the attacker's script tag were shown in these Android apps (counts of displayed ads):

  • more than one million each: MX Player (com.mxtech.videoplayer.ad) and Lark Player (com.dywx.larkplayer);
  • more than 700,000: Viber (com.viber.voip), with about 200,000 more in Viber for iOS;
  • about half a million each: Snap VPN (free.vpn.unblock.proxy.vpnpro), Truecaller (com.truecaller) and VivaCut (com.videoeditorpro.android).

The Citizen Lab also lists Yahoo Mail, Opera Mini, WetterOnline, Duolingo, WeMuslim, Period Calendar and, with ads "in the thousands", the dating apps Badoo and Grindr. Grindr user data in Xandr's real-time ad auctions is the subject of a NOK 92 million fine on Xandr by Norway's data protection authority. In the four months of MyDSP data, Discover-Tech bid on 3,770,286,576 impressions and won 441,954,291 (11.7%); 76.7% of the bids were for impressions in mobile apps.

For these apps, the evidence in the report is ad display, with no finding about any app's own code or conduct. The app-level figures are not split by exchange, so which ad SDK in each app requested the ad is not established. The Druid bidding database the Citizen Lab analyzed contained IP addresses or /24 ranges and city-level location, and "no instances of cookie IDs, advertising IDs, or GPS coordinates". A Discover-Tech impression, per the report, "does not in and of itself confirm targeting or infection with spyware."

Which ad exchanges were involved, and what did they do?

Vendor Role in Discover-Tech's buying, per the report Share of MyDSP bids (March to June 2026) Action after disclosure
Yandex ad exchange used through MyDSP 67.4% none reported; Yandex is absent from the 13 companies the Citizen Lab asked for comment
Google (Ad Manager and retargeting) ad exchange used through MyDSP; vendor lists 24.79% (24.74% Ad Manager, 0.05% retargeting) terminated access to its ad exchanges; removed from vendor registries in early October 2026
Vungle (Liftoff) mobile exchange used through MyDSP 7.24% "paused all Discover-Tech Ltd. access" pending a review (October 12, 2026)
Sunteng exchange used through MyDSP 0.03% no response to the Citizen Lab before its deadline
Beeswax (FreeWheel, Comcast) DSP used outside MyDSP; ID syncing outside MyDSP data removed Discover-Tech from Buyer Cloud
Eskimi DSP used outside MyDSP outside MyDSP data blocked accounts and domains

Source: report Table 2, section 9 and Correspondence. The bid shares cover MyDSP only; Beeswax and Eskimi volumes are absent from that data.

In the report's appendix, the Vungle (Liftoff) exchange is linked to an app SDK: "Both the SSP and the ad exchange rely on the Vungle SDK," which "is embedded in 150,000 mobile apps used by one billion people across 150 countries," according to the company. Vungle (Liftoff) told the Citizen Lab on October 12, 2026: "Because this review is ongoing, we are not currently in a position to confirm or comment on the specific factual assertions in your letter." On 2026-11-17, Liftoff's press page and news search results contained no later Liftoff statement on Discover-Tech.

Discover-Tech was listed by Google as a certified external vendor and an ad technology provider from 2020, and on IAB Europe's Transparency and Consent Framework Global Vendor List as vendor 778 from July 2, 2020. In its reply to the Citizen Lab, IAB Europe wrote that "Discover-Tech is already currently suspended from the GVL (since 8 October 2026) following an audit conducted by IAB Europe under its TCF Compliance Programmes, which identified violations of the TCF Policies." For users geolocated to GDPR regions, TCF consent signals for three vendors (Discover-Tech, Xandr and Beeswax) were processed by Discover-Tech's tracking pixel.

The Citizen Lab also reports a separate actor, DARK CARTOGRAPHER, that uses Discover-Tech infrastructure "to link device advertising IDs with phone numbers." The Citizen Lab announced a separate report on that actor; no such report was in the Citizen Lab research index on 2026-11-17.

What does an app scan and a traffic capture show?

A binary scan identifies the ad SDKs in an app build. In an APK, these include the Vungle (Liftoff) SDK (classes under com.vungle.ads, com.vungle.warren or io.liftoff), the Yandex Mobile Ads SDK and the Google Mobile Ads SDK; in an iOS build, the Vungle (Liftoff) and Google Mobile Ads SDKs among others. On iOS, whether the build links AdSupport.framework, the API that returns the IDFA, is part of the scan result. On Android, so is whether app code outside the ad SDK packages calls isLimitAdTrackingEnabled, the user's limit-ad-tracking setting. All of this is presence in the build: an SDK in the app, an API the code can call.

Whether the advertising ID was sent in an ad request is shown only by a network capture on a test phone: the request host, the identifier fields in the request, the time, and whether the request came before or after the app's consent screen was accepted. The hosts contacted while an ad is on screen are recorded in the capture too, so a request to a host such as mtrtb.com would appear there. A capture of one session contains the ads served to that test phone in that session, and per the Citizen Lab a targeted payload is returned only to a tasked identifier. The difference between presence and transmission and the limits of each method are set out on the methodology page. The same SDK inventory is applied in other posts to the cover apps of the Midnight Mimosa malware, whose ad fraud is paid through an ad SDK, and to the residential proxy SDKs installed by the XCPE botnet.

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