Last updated: 2026-11-17
On October 22, 2026, the restricted committee of the CNIL, France's data protection authority, fined two Fnac Darty group companies €7 million in decision SAN-2026-015: €6 million on FNAC DARTY PARTICIPATIONS ET SERVICES and €1 million on FNAC DIRECT, the operator of fnac.com and the Fnac app for France. The CNIL published the decision on October 29, 2026. The restricted committee found a breach of Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act, the French transposition of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. The finding concerns requests from the Fnac app, sent through an API to a third-party domain after the user tapped "Continuer sans accepter" ("Continue without accepting") in the app's consent banner.
What did the CNIL find in the Fnac app?
A CNIL delegation inspected the app online on March 6, 2024, reproducing the path of a user who downloads and uses it (decision, paragraph 8). The banner on first launch stated, in part: "En cliquant sur le bouton continuer sans accepter, ces derniers seront quand même déposés" ("By clicking the continue without accepting button, these [the technologies the banner describes as necessary] will still be placed"; paragraph 31, my translation). After that tap, the delegation found requests "contenant un identifiant attribué par la FNAC à l'utilisateur ainsi que des informations relatives à son activité telles que les produits consultés" ("containing an identifier assigned to the user by FNAC and information about the user's activity, such as the products viewed"), sent to a domain the CNIL's summary describes as third-party. The domain and the name of the API are redacted in the published text.
The companies listed the purposes (paragraph 27): personalized products based on browsing and purchase history, similar products, complementary products such as accessories, and training of the recommendation algorithm. The reads and writes after "Continuer sans accepter" were undisputed; the companies contested the need for prior consent, given those purposes (paragraph 32).
Why did the "strictly necessary" argument fail?
Article 82 exempts an operation whose sole purpose is to enable or facilitate communication by electronic means, and one "strictly necessary" for an online communication service the user expressly requested. The companies argued that the operations were "aide à la navigation" (navigation help) for the product catalog, and that downloading the app, launching it and accepting the account terms amounted to an express request (paragraphs 27 and 28).
The restricted committee rejected this purpose by purpose. Personalized products serve commercial targeting (paragraphs 34 and 35); complementary products aim to get the user to buy an additional product (paragraph 36); algorithm training is part of "l'objectif plus large du ciblage commercial" ("the wider goal of commercial targeting", paragraph 38). For similar products, the committee accepted that such a display "pourrait être, en théorie, selon les modalités de mise en œuvre" ("could, in theory, depending on how it is implemented") be strictly necessary, then held that it cannot be separated from the other purposes because one and the same read and write operation through the API served all of them. From paragraph 37 (my translation): "a cookie pursuing several purposes can fall under the Article 82 exemptions only where none of the purposes pursued by the read and/or write operations requires prior consent."
The companies also argued that the CNIL's position on apps was unsettled before its recommendation on mobile apps of September 24, 2024 (paragraph 49). The committee assessed the operations without reference to that recommendation and held that the breach "n'est pas nouveau" ("is not new"), even though the operations took place in an app (paragraph 55).
What did the CNIL order?
| Measure | Addressee | Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Fine | FNAC DARTY PARTICIPATIONS ET SERVICES | €6,000,000 |
| Fine | FNAC DIRECT | €1,000,000 |
| Injunction | Both companies | Demonstrate compliance with Article 82 within one month of notification |
| Daily penalty | Both companies | €10,000 per day of delay after that month |
| Publication | Both companies | Decision published on the CNIL site and Légifrance; company names removed two years after publication |
Source: SAN-2026-015, operative part.
On gravity, the committee cited over 1.5 million downloads of the app in France between March 2023 and March 2024 and 37,400 daily users on average over that period (paragraph 53). For the cap (€10 million or 2% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher, under Article 20 of the French Data Protection Act) and for economic capacity, it used the Fnac Darty group's 2025 turnover, "plus de 10 milliards d'euros" (more than €10 billion), after finding that the companies had not rebutted the presumption of decisive influence by their parent, FNAC DARTY SA (paragraphs 61 and 65 to 69). The committee classed the companies' answers to the CNIL's requests as cooperation owed under Article 31 GDPR and found no mitigating circumstance in them (paragraphs 56 and 57).
The API was decommissioned on December 19, 2024 on Android and December 20, 2024 on iOS, and a new tool went into production in January 2025 (paragraph 29). The committee issued the injunction because the companies described how the new tool works without showing that the described measures were in place when the investigation closed on September 15, 2026 (paragraphs 16 and 74).
Where did the case start?
NOYB, the Vienna-based privacy organization, filed the complaint on September 14, 2023; the CNIL received it on September 15 (paragraph 6). In the English version of the Fnac complaint, NOYB alleges that on an Android phone, with no tap on the banner, the app sent the advertising ID, device model and brand and OS version to the user analytics company Batch, the advertising ID "five times per minute". The decision concerns other requests: those sent through the redacted API after a refusal, found in March 2024. Per paragraph 9, the companies identified "un mauvais paramétrage d'un traceur" ("a misconfigured tracker") in the Android version after the complaint and released a corrected Android build on September 19, 2023. Neither that tracker nor the operator of the redacted domain is named in the published decision.
The CNIL took the Fnac decision as the French authority, under French ePrivacy law. Ireland's €403 million location data decision against Google was taken under the GDPR by the DPC as lead authority. Italy's Garante also applied national ePrivacy law, article 122 of the Italian Privacy Code, in its €805 million decision on Facebook camera roll suggestions, and Norway's Datatilsynet applied the GDPR in its NOK 92 million decision on Xandr and Grindr user data.
Can Fnac appeal?
The decision can be challenged before the Conseil d'État within two months of notification (final line of the decision). Fnac told AFP that it "conteste l'analyse juridique sur le fond" ("disputes the legal analysis on the merits") and reserves "le droit d'exercer les recours à [sa] disposition" ("the right to use the remedies available to it"), as reported by Le Monde on October 29, 2026. The notification date is not public, so the deadline cannot be computed; Conseil d'État records were not searched for this post.
What does a capture show after a refusal?
The Fnac decision turns on one sequence: the refusal tap, then requests to a third-party host with a user ID and viewed products. When I capture an app on a test device, the session can answer the consent banner with a refusal such as "reject" or "continue without accepting". The tap is logged with its time and the screen video. Every request is recorded with its host, path, body and time, so the requests sent after the refusal can be listed. An app-assigned user ID, an advertising ID or product IDs, where present, are visible in the request body. On Android, the scan lists a consent management platform SDK in the binary (Google UMP, OneTrust, Sourcepoint, Didomi, Usercentrics, InMobi Choice) and app code calling it to request consent; those are presence findings, and only a capture shows what was sent after the banner. A capture covers one build on one device on one date; the purpose of the recipient's processing, such as recommendations or algorithm training, is outside what a capture shows. Consent on iOS in the EU is covered in the post on Apple's EU App Tracking Transparency prompt.
Each static finding is linked to its file and line, and each traffic finding to its capture: what a scan checks, what a capture records and their limits. I run consent investigations for lawyers and for researchers working with lawyers, on one app or a list of apps in bulk. Sign up for a CanITrustThat account to run your own research, let us run an investigation for you, or read the teardowns.