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Midnight Mimosa malware: 13 Google Play apps and an ad SDK

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 4 min read

Last updated: 2026-10-13

On October 8, 2026, Bitdefender Labs published its report on Midnight Mimosa, Android malware preinstalled in the firmware of low-cost phones, and listed 13 apps "currently present on Google Play" with the campaign's ad-fraud family markers. Per the report, an ad network credits fabricated impressions and clicks "to the application hosting its SDK and its ad unit identifiers." On October 13, 2026, HTTP 404 was the response for all 13 Play listings.

What is the Midnight Mimosa malware?

Bitdefender found the campaign on "low-cost, multi-brand Android devices built on MediaTek platforms." The core package, com.android.system.lite (label "System", versionCode 900000), is "a pre-installed Android system application" that "ships signed for the platform, runs as the system user, and has the rights to install and remove packages and grant permissions to other apps without any user interaction." The same core is present as com.android.sys.prot, com.android.sys.gmsprot and com.android.sys.bcprot, and the owner cannot uninstall it.

Bitdefender calls this core the enabler. It installs at least 32 disguised cover apps (weather, app-lock, file-manager, OCR and audio-editor apps among them). Over about two years, the campaign was observed "on thousands of unique devices across more than 150 countries," with the largest shares of devices in Mexico, France and Italy.

Before each install, the enabler's plugins run pm disable com.android.vending, which switches off the Play Store app. Per Bitdefender, the on-device scanner of Google Play Protect is part of that app. After the install succeeds or fails, the plugins run pm enable com.android.vending. On some samples com.android.vending is recorded as the installer while the APK has no Play signature block ("frosting"), so Google Play is shown as the install source on the device.

Bitdefender maps the enabler's platform signing certificate (CN=ZED, [email protected]) to Shenzhen Zediel Co., Ltd. From the report: "This technical attribution does not constitute proof that Shenzhen Zediel authored, distributed, or was aware of the malware." Bitdefender also found the malware on phones without Zediel-signed firmware.

How does Midnight Mimosa earn money from ads?

The com.wz.sdk plugin shows ads as full-screen activities and overlays, triggered when the display turns on or by commands pushed across the cover apps' "ad mesh" while the phone is idle. Per the report, the ad surface "is also marked as secure" (on Android, the FLAG_SECURE window flag), so it is left out of screenshots and screen recordings. The plugin fakes clicks and reports conversions after a 60-second timer. Every event is sent to api.weatherlive[.]world/odborwer_dot/cm.

From the report's "Who gets billed" section: "Fabricated clicks only earn money if an ad network attributes them to somebody, and attribution follows the ad SDK. The network credits an impression and a click to the application hosting its SDK and its ad unit identifiers." No ad units are present in the enabler. The cover apps it installs are "ordinary-looking apps carrying a legitimate ad SDK" and "the only part of the scheme an ad network ever sees." Neither the ad SDK nor the ad network is named in the report.

Which Google Play apps contain the Midnight Mimosa code?

Bitdefender lists 13 packages "carrying the same family markers as the dropped cover apps, in builds distributed by Play itself." The Play signature block is present in these builds, so Google Play distributed them. The 13 packages are signed with "13 different signing certificates, spread across at least two developer accounts, fivedev and CPS Developer, with the remainder unresolved." Per the report, the apps "load and display ads outside the app, sometimes even when the user isn't even using the phone." Five of the 13 also appear in the report's table of packages installed by one studied enabler on real devices.

Package Devices where one studied enabler installed it Play listing on 2026-10-13
picturetranslate.extractor.text.lite 182 HTTP 404
appicon.diy.tools.prop 139 HTTP 404
com.dl.guard.lock 120 HTTP 404
com.dmstudio.weather 97 HTTP 404
com.audify.editor.pro 2 HTTP 404
com.audify.editor.wavrge not in table HTTP 404
com.prorestore.qr not in table HTTP 404
com.message.recovery.prorestore not in table HTTP 404
com.go.weather.mot not in table HTTP 404
com.cool.weather.yl not in table HTTP 404
com.notemaster.record.mark not in table HTTP 404
com.arabmusic.tap.aghani_tamerhosny not in table HTTP 404
org.life.goal.tools not in table HTTP 404

Source: Bitdefender's Play list and enabler install table. Play status from play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=<package> on 2026-10-13; the response for a control listing was HTTP 200. The 404 results are the listing state on October 13 only; no date or reason for that state is in the report or the check.

Under Android developer verification, which began on September 30, 2026 in four countries, a package name and its signing key are registered to a developer whose identity Google has verified. Bitdefender resolved developer accounts for only part of the 13 certificates.

What does an Android app scan show for Midnight Mimosa?

The 13 Play packages are store APKs, the file a binary scan parses. A scan report contains the ad SDKs in the dex, a SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission declared beside an ad SDK, and the host of every http or https URL in the dex and resources, api.weatherlive.world included where present. Per the report, each cover app exports MyDataService under the action com.media.am.intent.action.BIND_SERVICE; where present, that declaration is in the APK's manifest. All of this is presence in the build. In the enabler, the modules are "provisioned from a remote server, so a sample examined statically often contains no active payload at all," per Bitdefender's conclusions.

Transmission is recorded in a traffic capture on a test device: requests to api.weatherlive.world, and ad impressions reported while no ad is on screen or while the app is in the background. The enabler is in the firmware's system partition, outside any store APK. Finding it takes the phone's package list or system image. Removing it requires "firmware-level cleanup or disabling the component over ADB."

The same SDK inventory is applied in earlier posts to an exported activity in the EngageLab push SDK and to four ad SDKs that EFF found sending precise location. What a scan checks and the limits of a scan are on the methodology page.

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