Last updated: 2026-11-17
On 2026-10-29, California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced a $1.8 million settlement with Lyft, Inc. over the opt-out of sale and sharing in the Lyft apps. Key point: for a business that serves its customers through an app, the AG's position is that the opt-out of sale and sharing has to be offered inside that app, and a link from the in-app privacy policy to a web form does not meet the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).
The People filed the complaint, case No. CGC-26-641775 in San Francisco Superior Court on 2026-10-28, under the CCPA and the Unfair Competition Law. The stipulated final judgment, file-stamped 2026-10-29 and signed by Judge Christine Van Aken, orders $1.8 million in civil penalties and "a CLEAR AND CONSPICUOUS OPT-OUT LINK within the LYFT APP". Lyft stipulated to the judgment "without DEFENDANT admitting any liability" (judgment, p. 2), and every statement below about Lyft's conduct is an allegation.
What did California allege against Lyft?
Lyft "exclusively offers its services through its mobile app": riders use the Lyft app, drivers use the Lyft Driver app, and a person who both rides and drives has a single account with the same credentials for both apps (complaint ¶ 6). From ¶ 7:
Starting in mid-2023, Lyft began disclosing some of this information, such as device identifiers, IP addresses, and coarse geolocation data, to third parties to personally target ads to Lyft passengers, including California consumers.
In the same paragraph, the disclosures are alleged to have "allowed the company to charge more for the advertisements on its app and created a new revenue stream for Lyft." No recipient is named in the complaint, the judgment or the release.
The case started with the AG's location data sweep announced on 2025-03-10, in which the AG sent letters to "advertising networks, mobile app providers, and data brokers". The sweep result, from complaint ¶ 9: "the Attorney General found that while Lyft did not sell or share consumers' precise geolocation information, Lyft did sell or share customers coarse geolocation, and its apps did not contain CCPA-compliant opt-outs." In the release, the non-precise geolocation Lyft collects is described as "city, state, region, or zip code". Sales of precise location fall under separate state laws, such as Connecticut's sale ban, in force since 2026-10-01.
According to ¶¶ 10–11, a user went from links in Lyft's in-app privacy policy to the "Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information" page in a mobile browser, then had "to resubmit their login credentials and verify their identity before effectuating the opt-out, even though consumers were already logged into Lyft's app". In Figure 2 of the complaint, a screenshot of that page on lyft.com, this text is above an "Opt out" button: "to deliver relevant personalized ads to you on and off Lyft's platform, we use and may share with third parties your personal information." The sentence after it on the same page is "Even though they involve no exchange of money, these disclosures may constitute 'sharing' or 'selling' of personal information under certain U.S. state privacy laws".
The People plead two causes of action: the CCPA, citing Civil Code §§ 1798.120 and 1798.135 and regulations §§ 7013 and 7026, and the Unfair Competition Law (¶¶ 13–15). In the prayer, the People ask for $2,663 per violation or $7,988 per intentional violation, the amounts the California Privacy Protection Agency set for 2025 under its CPI adjustment.
What does the CCPA require of an opt-out in a mobile app?
§ 7026 of the CCPA regulations (version effective 2026-01-01) is cited in the complaint. Under § 7026(a), a business that sells or shares personal information must provide two or more methods to opt out, and "At least one method offered shall reflect the manner in which the business primarily interacts with the consumer." Under § 7026(b), the methods "shall be easy for consumers to execute, shall require minimal steps". Under § 7026(c), a business may not require a consumer "to create an account or provide additional information beyond what is necessary", and under § 7026(d) it "shall not require a verifiable consumer request" for an opt-out.
A separate placement rule for apps is in § 7003(d): "For mobile applications, a conspicuous link shall be included in the business's privacy policy, which must be accessible through the mobile application's platform page or download page. It must also be accessible through a link within the application, such as through the application's settings menu." The Lyft opt-out path started at the privacy policy opened in the app. In the AG's release, that path is called "a cumbersome process that does not satisfy the CCPA's requirements". The AG's reading of the rules, from complaint ¶ 2: "a business offering its services through a mobile app must provide an easy-to-execute opt-out method within that app." The judgment was entered "without the taking of proof and without trial or adjudication of any fact or law" (judgment, p. 2), so that reading is unadjudicated.
Under California AB 2561, in force from 2027-01-01, an app may not undo "a user's affirmative configuration of a privacy setting" without the user's consent; a privacy setting is "any user-configurable option within an application's privacy, or similarly labeled, menu" that governs how personal information is collected, used or shared.
What does the Lyft settlement order?
The judgment takes effect on entry (¶ 43). In the table, "on entry" marks terms with no separate deadline. Judge Van Aken dated her signature 10/29/2026 and the clerk's file stamp is dated OCT 29 2026; the dates below assume entry on 2026-10-29, and the court's register of actions would confirm the entry date.
| Term | Judgment ¶ | Deadline |
|---|---|---|
| $1,800,000 paid to the California Attorney General's Office | 36 | 30 days: 2026-11-28 |
| Opt-out link in the Lyft app that "shall immediately effectuate" the opt-out across all Lyft services | 25(a) | on entry |
| Logged-in opt-out, including by opt-out preference signal, applied to every service tied to the account | 25(b) | on entry |
| Logged-out opt-out applied to that browser, app or device and its pseudonymous profiles | 25(c) | on entry |
| A way to confirm the opt-out was processed, such as in account settings | 26 | on entry |
| Third parties that received the data between the opt-out request and Lyft's compliance told of the opt-out and directed to forward it | 28 | on entry |
| One-time notice of the in-app opt-out to app users since 2020-01-01 who have not opted out | 30 | 60 days: 2026-12-28 |
| Risk assessments for selling or sharing, sensitive data, and geolocation used for advertising | 32 | 180 days: 2027-04-27 |
| Opt-out and geolocation monitoring program, annual report to the AG | 34 | within 180 days, for 3 years |
"CONSUMER" in the judgment means a California resident and "includes LYFT drivers and riders" (¶ 4), and "LYFT APP" means Lyft's "mobile applications for CONSUMERS" (¶ 8), so on those definitions the in-app link term applies to the rider app and the driver app. Reports to the AG are confidential (¶ 35). The $1.8 million is a civil penalty paid to the AG's Office (¶ 36), with no consumer fund or claim form in the judgment. In the Five Below app lawsuit, consumer claims over in-app tracking are pleaded in eight counts, among them the federal Wiretap Act and the California Invasion of Privacy Act.
How does the Lyft case fit the AG's CCPA app cases?
According to the release, the Lyft case is the California DOJ's ninth enforcement action under the CCPA. An earlier CCPA case over app opt-outs is Jam City, announced 2025-11-21: $1.4 million in civil penalties, the investigation's finding that Jam City "did not offer CCPA compliant opt-outs in any of its 21 mobile apps", and an order to "provide in-app methods for consumers to opt-out".
In the Lyft release, Bonta calls Lyft "a company that offers its services exclusively through an app" and states that it "was selling and sharing user's personal information for targeted advertising without giving users a way to opt-out from within that app." In the release, the AG also directs Californians to CalPrivacy's DROP platform, through which a Californian can send one deletion request to every registered data broker. The Lyft complaint concerns coarse location and identifiers; the federal Kochava FTC order concerns sensitive location data.
What does Lyft's Google Play label say?
In the Google Play Data safety section of the Lyft rider app (me.lyft.android), checked on 2026-11-17, "Approximate location" is listed as shared for purposes including "Advertising or marketing", and name, email address and phone number are listed as shared for "Advertising or marketing". "Device or other IDs" is listed as shared for "App functionality, Analytics" and as collected for purposes including "Advertising or marketing". In the Data safety section of the Lyft Driver app (com.lyft.android.driver), checked the same day, "Device or other IDs", "Approximate location" and "Precise location" are each listed as shared for purposes including "Advertising or marketing". Both labels are self-reported, are based on Google Play's definition of sharing rather than the CCPA's, and were read after the judgment; the complaint concerns conduct from mid-2023.
What can an app scan and a traffic capture show for an in-app opt-out?
The in-app opt-out term can be tested on a phone: under ¶ 25(a), the in-app opt-out link "shall immediately effectuate" the consumer's choice to opt out across all Lyft services. In a traffic capture, each request the app makes is recorded with its host, path and body, so comparing a session recorded before the opt-out with one recorded after it establishes whether the advertising ID or a coarse location value is still sent to ad hosts, and whether a us_privacy or gpp value is present in those requests. A capture covers the build and the session recorded, on the capture date. A connection that cannot be decrypted is recorded with its server address and without its content, and what a recipient does with data on its servers is outside the capture.
When I scan an Android build, the CanITrustThat static findings include:
- the advertising SDKs present in the build;
- the IAB US Privacy key
IABUSPrivacy_Stringor a Global Privacy Platform key such asIABGPP_HDR_GppStringin the dex; - the
AD_IDpermission declared in a build whose dex contains neither the US Privacy key nor any GPP key.
A static finding is evidence of presence in the build, and a scan is limited to the build scanned. Only a capture shows that data was sent.
Every static finding is linked to its file and line, and every traffic finding to its capture. How a transmission is established and the limits of a scan are on the methodology page. I run app investigations for lawyers and the researchers working with them, on one app or a list in bulk. Sign up for a CanITrustThat account to run your own research, let us run an investigation for you, or read the app teardowns.