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Five Below app lawsuit: Meta Pixel, TikTok and LogRocket replay

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 6 min read

Last updated: 2026-10-13

On 2026-09-30 Tamara Rubio filed a proposed class action against Five Below, Inc., Rubio v. Five Below, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-07553-KBH (E.D. Pa., Judge Kelley Brisbon Hodge). In the Five Below lawsuit, the plaintiff alleges that the retailer's iOS and Android shopping apps contain "the Facebook Pixel, the Facebook Software Development Kit ('Facebook SDK'), the TikTok Pixel, and the LogRocket session replay software" (complaint ¶ 1), and that page views, taps, cart activity and purchases were sent to Meta, TikTok and LogRocket without users' consent. Five Below is the only defendant. The plaintiff pleads eight counts, among them the federal Wiretap Act, Pennsylvania's all-party consent wiretap statute and the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA). Everything below about the apps is an allegation; no appearance for Five Below is on the docket as of 2026-10-13.

What does the Five Below lawsuit allege the app sent?

Captured traffic from the Five Below iOS app to Meta, TikTok and LogRocket is reproduced in the complaint. In the Meta capture (¶ 54), ev=PageView and ev=SubscribedButtonClick events are sent to https://www.facebook.com/tr/ with pixel ID id=1787661074876741, category page URLs such as dl=https://www.fivebelow.com/categories/beauty/makeup/lip-gloss, and the cookie value fbp=fb.1.1784040039993.454163249954704140. In Meta's documentation the third field of fbp is the time the _fbp cookie was saved, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch; 1784040039993 converts to 2026-07-14 14:40 UTC (my conversion). The allegations about the apps are based on the plaintiff's last use in July 2026 (footnote 1); the device that produced the captures is not stated. ViewContent, Search, AddToCart, InitiateCheckout, Purchase and CompleteRegistration events are also alleged (¶ 57).

In the TikTok capture (¶ 66), a request to https://analytics.tiktok.com/api/v2/pixel/act contains pixel code C3SQL5KVE57P75FJ1DD0, action "Click", the tap position x 152 and y 565, inner_text "Add to Cart", and device "ios". CompletePayment events are alleged to contain the order value and currency (¶ 69).

In the LogRocket capture (¶ 78), POST https://r.lgrckt-in.com/i?a=65xtuw%2Ffive-below-production is sent with a persistent user ID and a recording ID. The payload is alleged to contain "serialized page markup, screen/URL identifiers, tap coordinates, element text, input change events" and "records of the network requests the Apps themselves made to Five Below's servers and to other third parties while Plaintiff used them, including the authorization credentials transmitted with those requests." An Authorization: Bearer header from one recorded request is visible in the capture image on page 21; what that token grants access to is not stated.

Limits of the captures: all are from iOS, and no capture from the Android app, com.hollar.android, is in the complaint. Each capture has origin https://www.fivebelow.com and a user agent containing is_5b_mobile_app. The TikTok request is attributed to the JavaScript library pixel.js (¶ 66(b)), and LogRocket's JavaScript script is pleaded as the deployment for "web pages rendered inside a mobile application" (¶ 73). My reading of these headers is that the captured screens are fivebelow.com web pages displayed inside the app; which app screens are web pages is not stated in the complaint. ep1.facebook.com is named as a Facebook SDK endpoint (¶ 50); no captured SDK request is in the complaint.

Why is session replay pleaded as different from the pixels?

From ¶ 83:

Session replay recording differs in kind from the event-level tracking performed by the Facebook and TikTok Pixels. [...] session replay captures the user's entire interaction with the Apps, continuously and in full, including the hesitation, backtracking, abandoned searches, and abandoned carts that the user never chose to share with anyone.

LogRocket's documentation on default settings is quoted in the complaint (¶¶ 74–77). From the iOS redaction reference: "By default, the SDK will capture views automatically." From the text sanitization reference: "Movement and clicks over redacted elements will be captured, but not the selector or text in the redacted element." From LogRocket's privacy page: "We designed our SDK to allow developers to determine what information to hide from LogRocket reports." Which elements Five Below redacted, if any, is not stated in the complaint.

In the Five Below privacy policy (Last Updated: August 27, 2025), Google Analytics is named, along with "web beacons (also known as tracking pixels), embedded scripts". LogRocket, TikTok and the words "session replay" appear nowhere in it or in the supplemental US state privacy notice (Last Updated October 6, 2025). The plaintiff alleges the privacy policy is never presented in the app and cannot be opened from it, and that the terms shown on the download screen and at checkout "cannot be reviewed or accepted" because the links and acceptance elements do not work (¶ 143(d)–(e)).

What claims and damages does the Five Below class action lawsuit seek?

The plaintiff lives in Downey, California, used the app through July 2026 and entered her name, email, phone, shipping address and payment card (¶¶ 101–102). The plaintiff estimates the class at "the hundreds of thousands" (¶ 115) and pleads a nationwide class, a California subclass and a California purchaser subclass (¶ 113).

Count Claim Class Relief sought
I Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520 Nationwide Greater of $100 a day or $10,000 per member
II Pennsylvania WESCA, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5701 et seq. Nationwide $100 a day or $1,000
III CIPA § 631 California subclass $5,000 per violation (§ 637.2)
IV CIPA § 632 California subclass $5,000 per violation (§ 637.2)
V California UCL Purchaser subclass Injunction to remove the trackers and repair the terms screens; restitution and disgorgement
VI Intrusion upon seclusion Nationwide, or California subclass in the alternative Damages
VII Invasion of privacy Nationwide, or California subclass in the alternative Damages
VIII Unjust enrichment Nationwide, or California subclass in the alternative Disgorgement of revenues and profits

For Count I the plaintiff invokes the crime-tort exception to the Wiretap Act's one-party consent rule (¶¶ 125–126). In the prayer for relief, the plaintiff also asks for a declaration that the arbitration clause and class waiver in the app terms are unenforceable. The CIPA counts are pleaded under §§ 631 and 632, with no § 638.51 pen register count; under SB 690, that claim type becomes an Attorney General action for apps from 2027-01-01.

Docket entries to date are the complaint, summons and standard notices on 2026-09-30, and a clerk's note on 2026-10-01 that the designation form was missing.

How has the Third Circuit ruled on wiretap claims over website tracking?

The Third Circuit has read Pennsylvania's wiretap statute broadly and has affirmed the dismissal of a session replay case for lack of standing. In Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts (2022), the court read WESCA to have no broad direct-party exception, noting the legislature "could have codified a direct-party exception like the one in the Federal Wiretap Act", and held "the place of interception is the point at which the signals were routed to NaviStone's servers." The Rubio plaintiff is in California; WESCA is pleaded for a nationwide class on the allegation that the violations "occurred in, and emanated from" Pennsylvania, where Five Below is headquartered and, on information and belief, decided to embed the trackers (¶ 142).

In Cook v. GameStop (August 2025), a session replay case over Microsoft Clarity, the court affirmed a dismissal for lack of Article III standing because "the information captured by the session replay code was not sensitive or personal" and "she did not share her name, contact information, address, or billing information while on GameStop's website." Cook is not cited in the Rubio complaint; the plaintiff alleges she entered her name, contact details, address and payment card in the app (¶ 102).

Outside the Third Circuit, the Flo Health case went to trial over the Facebook SDK in the Flo app, and in August 2025 a jury found that Meta intentionally eavesdropped on or recorded Flo users' conversations. The plaintiffs now ask for $5,000 under CIPA for each of 222,115 California users (Flo Health judgment motion). In Rodriguez v. Google, a $425,651,947 verdict on intrusion upon seclusion (pleaded here as Count VI) and invasion of privacy under the California Constitution stands after post-trial motions; Google appealed on 2026-09-21. The _fbp cookie in the Rubio capture is also at issue in the Meta localhost case.

What do the Five Below store listings and privacy labels say?

In the Google Play Data safety section for "Five Below: Shop Fun Finds" (1M+ downloads), name, email, address, phone, payment info, purchase history, device or other IDs and crash logs are listed as shared. "App activity" and "Web browsing" appear in neither the shared nor the collected list. The same section contains the line "Data can't be deleted". In the App Store listing (version 7.0.2), Usage Data is listed under "Data Used to Track You", and Purchases, Contact Info, Identifiers and Usage Data as linked to the user. Both labels are self-reported by the developer and were checked on 2026-10-13, after the July 2026 period in the complaint.

What can an app scan show for LogRocket and Meta tracking?

When I scan an Android build, the CanITrustThat static findings include:

  • LogRocket SDK classes present in the build;
  • calls from app code to LogRocket's masking functions, such as redactView and addRedactionTag;
  • a session replay SDK in a build with an SDK init provider declared in the manifest (code that runs before the first screen opens);
  • Meta's AutoLogAppEventsEnabled and AdvertiserIDCollectionEnabled flags set to true in the manifest, and calls from app code to the matching Meta SDK switches;
  • JavaScript interfaces added to a WebView.

A static finding is evidence of presence in the build. What was sent is recorded in a traffic capture: each request with its host, path and body, before and after any consent screen. Both kinds of finding are limited to the build scanned, on the scan date.

When I scan an app, every static finding is linked to its file and line, and every traffic finding to its capture. What a scan checks and the limits of a scan are on the methodology page. I run app tracking investigations for lawyers and the researchers working with them, on one app or a list in bulk. Sign up for a CanITrustThat account to run your own research, let us run an investigation for you, or read the app teardowns.

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