Can I trust MyBible?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- Bible reading progress, notes, and history stay on the device and are not accessible to the developer or sold to data brokers. Reading habits are not shared with ad networks. Firebase Analytics and Crashlytics are integrated for performance monitoring.
- Main concern
- Firebase Analytics auto-collects session data before user consent can be given
- The developer's description
- MyBible makes it easier to read and access the Bible with you wherever you go. Start your day with the Verse of the Day, read and download different Bible translations, listen to Bible chapters, make notes, and highlight, copy and share your favourite Bible passages.
- Third-party services
- 7
- Findings rated low or higher
- 4
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
One criterion not metSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
Manifest Mismatch
An item rated high or above is openDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
The app does not require a user account, and all Bible content, reading history, notes, and settings are stored on the device. There is no server-side data to export or delete. Removing the app removes all the data, and the absence of any account or cloud service the developer controls means there is no lock-in to escape.
Red flags
The app's privacy declarations do not match its code
Why this result
The privacy declarations shipped in this build, or the ones on the store listing, state less than the code does. Declarations of this kind are what a store, a regulator and a person comparing two apps rely on.
Strengths
- Bible reading data (books, chapters, notes, reading history) stays on the device with no developer server access
- No advertising SDK present — reading habits are not shared with ad networks for targeting
- App operates without user accounts — no credentials, passwords, or personal profiles are created or stored
- Backup extraction is blocked (allowBackup=false), protecting local storage from ADB extraction
- All network traffic uses HTTPS — cleartext connections are blocked at the application level
- No known exploitable vulnerabilities in any bundled SDK version
What the app contains
7 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Analytics
- Firebase Crashlytics
- Firebase Cloud Messaging
- Firebase Installations
- Google Advertising ID (play-services-ads-identifier)
- OneTrust CMP
- Google Privacy Sandbox Attribution Reporting
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Room | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Glide | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Material Components | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Gson | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Firebase | not recorded | none confirmed |
| OneTrust | not recorded | none confirmed |
| OkHttp | not recorded | none confirmed |
Changes since the previous scan
- Version 1.3.1 (versionCode 599), score 85.
- Score 71 before, 85 after.
- Version 0.4.72 (Build 182) before, 1.3.1 (versionCode 599) after.
- Score change since version 0.4.72 (Build 182): +14 points.
- Since the previous scan: 11 findings added, 8 removed.
- Version 0.4.72 (Build 182), score 71.
- First public scan of this app.
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Build SHA-256
- 62395f129bef456d048b710921e6f176ea417159c05ae29db8386028bbe4b522
- Rule pack
- citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1
- Files decompiled
- 6,395
- Scan date
- 12 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
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