Can I trust Opal Screen Time Limit & Timer?

Trust checks

• Secure by Design

  ● Strong

  Strong security foundation

  Why this result

  This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.

  The app enforces HTTPS across all network connections and uses strong, modern encryption throughout. Independent binary analysis across more than 40 built-in libraries returned zero memory corruption, injection, or format-string vulnerabilities. On iOS, the app uses Apple's native cryptography framework with industry-standard encryption algorithms and stores authentication credentials in device-local secure storage that does not sync to iCloud. Authentication tokens are never placed in URLs or logs. A third-party paywall component registers a browser interface for processing subscription purchases, but the subscription screen is not accessible from other apps and all external navigation within it is blocked, consistent with standard practice for this SDK category. No hardcoded production secrets, no certificate validation bypasses, and no cleartext traffic were found.

• Data Minimization

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Tracking lacks clear disclosure

  Why this result

  This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.

• Manifest Mismatch

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

  Why this result

  The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

• User Control

  ● Strong

  No lock-in

  Why this result

  The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

  No proprietary data formats, artificial cancellation barriers, or blocked data-export paths were identified. The app uses standard database structures for local storage and relies on common authentication infrastructure. No mechanisms that would make it unreasonably difficult to stop using the service or switch to an alternative were found.

• Truly Local

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Contains code to send personal data off the device

  Why this result

  This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.

What the app contains

• 18 services

  Third-party services the scan names in the build:

  • Firebase Analytics
  • Firebase Crashlytics
  • Firebase Auth
  • Firebase App Check
  • Amplitude Analytics
  • Amplitude Session Replay
  • Amplitude Experiment
  • Adjust
  • Facebook SDK (FBSDKCoreKit, FBAEMKit)
  • ContextSDK
  • OneSignal
  • RevenueCat
  • Superwall
  • Google App Measurement
  • GoogleMobileAds
  • Google Ads On-Device Conversion
  • PairIP
  • ipify.org

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Build SHA-256

e7f65dda7e6ae6085fef8d016c32173a7e599765129d48579feae413b07977cb

Rule pack

citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1

Files decompiled

15,656

Scan date

15 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.