Can I trust WHOOP?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- The build includes code to direct health and biometric data, including heart rate, HRV, sleep, and GPS, only to WHOOP's own infrastructure, and contains no code to pass it to advertising or analytics networks. The build includes code to send usage data to Amplitude for product analytics and to Sentry for crash reporting. The build contains no code that reads advertising identifiers, and internal performance telemetry is processed locally; the build contains no code to send it to third-party clo…
- Main concern
- ATS globally disabled, exposing biometric and payment data to network attackers
- Third-party services
- 17
- Findings rated low or higher
- 5
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
One criterion not metSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
It also ships a testing library that serves no purpose in a production release.
Data Minimization
StrongTracking done right
Why this result
The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.
WHOOP does not request advertising tracking permission and does not access the advertising identifier used for cross-app tracking. A dedicated consent management module is present in the app with screens covering privacy policy, terms of use, and health data marketing consent, indicating that analytics and marketing communications are gated behind user approval. No evidence was found of analytics or marketing services activating before the user reaches a consent checkpoint.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
This build contains code for this item; what that code does at run time was not observed.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
No proprietary data formats that would trap user data, artificial obstacles to switching services, or confirmed barriers to account deletion were found in the app's code and configuration.
Truly Local
One criterion not metContains code to send personal data off the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.
This build contains code for this item; what that code does at run time was not observed.
Strengths
- Apple App Attest cryptographically verifies requests come from a genuine, unmodified WHOOP app on a real device
- Certificate pinning implemented via custom trust anchors, blocking TLS interception by fraudulently issued CA certificates
- OAuth and SSO flows use the system browser's isolated session, preventing token interception via JavaScript bridge attacks
- The code that handles health and biometric data (heart rate, HRV, sleep, GPS, raw sensor data) names only WHOOP's own infrastructure as a destination, and the build includes no code to pass it to analytics or marketing SDKs
- No cross-app advertising tracking: no IDFA, no ATT framework, no advertising identifier access
- Internal telemetry is addressed in code only to a localhost OpenTelemetry collector, and the build includes no code to transmit it to external cloud backends
- App Group shared container restricted to WHOOP's own Team ID — no third-party app can access the shared data
- Dedicated privacy consent module with granular consent flow covering health data marketing, privacy policy, and terms of use
- Amplitude EU data residency endpoint configured for GDPR-compliant regional data handling
- Iterable SDK auth tokens stored in the iOS Keychain rather than unprotected storage
What the app contains
17 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Amplitude
- Iterable
- Sentry
- SEON (SeonSDK)
- Stripe
- AWS Cognito
- OpenTelemetry
- Stream Chat
- Stream Video
- NordicDFU
- Kingfisher
- OHHTTPStubs
- Lottie
- Memfault
- Intercom
- Salesforce
- Typeform
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Whoop | not recorded | none confirmed |
Changes since the previous scan
- Version 5.63.0 (build 655779), score 85.
- Score 82 before, 85 after.
- Score change since version 5.63.0 (build 655779): +3 points.
- Since the previous scan: 7 findings added, 9 removed.
- Version 5.63.0 (build 655779), score 82.
- Score 90 before, 82 after.
- Version 5.63.0 (build 655779), score 90.
- Score 76 before, 90 after.
- Version 5.45.0 (Build 553019) before, 5.63.0 (build 655779) after.
- Version 5.45.0 (Build 553019), score 76.
- First public scan of this app.
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Scan date
- 31 July 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
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