Can I trust SUUUUUU?
This scan is more than 90 days old. The store may list a newer version than the one described here.
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- The build includes code to authenticate users through Google Sign-In, Apple Sign-In, and SmartAuth, a third-party phone verification service. The app includes code to send app usage data to Firebase Analytics, and code to store user content in Google's Firestore cloud database. Push notification delivery is handled by Firebase Cloud Messaging.
- Main concern
- SmartAuth SDK forces Georgian locale on all users during phone verification
- The developer's description
- A fun, simple messaging app where users send playful messages to friends. Designed for casual communication and expressing emotions creatively.
- Third-party services
- 14
- Findings rated low or higher
- 1
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
StrongStrong security foundation
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.
No serious security vulnerabilities were found. The app correctly protects all network connections with industry-standard encryption, does not expose any server secrets in the app code, and has no bypasses of certificate validation or authentication safeguards. The only finding was a minor bug in a third-party phone verification library that temporarily displays text in the wrong language — not a security risk.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
Manifest Mismatch
StrongEverything visible
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does: the data categories collected, the companies named in code as their recipients, and the identifiers attached to each. The comparison covers the store listing, the in-app privacy text and any privacy manifest shipped in the build. Every claim compared matched the code here.
The app's Play Store listing states that personal information may be gathered and disclosed to third parties, which is consistent with what the code actually does. No specific contradiction between the published disclosures and the app's actual behavior was found.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
The app uses standard cloud infrastructure and no proprietary data formats that would trap your information. There is no evidence of artificial barriers to stopping use of the service or removing your account. The app's core data — your account and notification history — is stored using widely supported platforms with standard deletion paths.
Truly Local
One criterion not metContains code to send personal data off the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.
Strengths
- No custom TrustManager or HostnameVerifier bypasses found
- All network traffic uses HTTPS/TLS (gRPC over TLS for Firestore)
- Firebase App Check with Play Integrity enforced on Cloud Functions endpoint
- No server-side secrets or API keys exposed in client code
- No exploitable exported components found
- Firebase Auth token validation protects backend endpoints
What the app contains
14 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Core
- Firebase Auth
- Firebase App Check
- Firebase Firestore
- Firebase Messaging (FCM)
- Firebase Analytics
- Firebase Dynamic Links
- Firebase Remote Config
- Google Sign-In
- SmartAuth (fman.ge)
- Sign In with Apple
- Flutter Engine
- gRPC
- OkHttp
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Advertising ID client | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Sign-In | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Play Core | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Play Integrity | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Gson | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Firebase | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Protocol Buffers | not recorded | none confirmed |
Show all 13 librariesShow fewer
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Files decompiled
- 9,390
- Scan date
- 16 June 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.