Can I trust Philips Hue?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- Location data from geofence automations stays on the device and is not forwarded to advertising or analytics services. Bridge login credentials are stored in hardware-protected on-device storage, excluded from cloud and device backups. The build includes code to send usage and crash data to Amplitude, Firebase, Braze, and Sentry.
- Main concern
- TLS validation disabled globally by Flutter plugin, exposing all HTTPS traffic to MITM
- The developer's description
- The official Philips Hue app is the most comprehensive way to organize, control, and customize your Philips Hue smart lights and accessories. Manage lights in rooms, create scenes, and set automations.
- Third-party services
- 21
- Findings rated low or higher
- 11
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
One criterion not metSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
The analysis found no evidence of proprietary data formats that trap user content, no barriers to account deletion, and no artificial obstacles to leaving the platform. No lock-in mechanisms were identified in the app's code or configuration.
Strengths
- Login sessions and bridge credentials are protected on the device using Android Keystore-backed AES-256-GCM encryption, hardware-isolated on supported devices
- All app data is excluded from cloud and ADB backups, preventing credential exposure via backup channels
- Background location data is processed on the device: geofence transition events are handled locally and the build includes no code to forward GPS coordinates to any analytics or advertising endpoint
- Firmware and asset downloads use app-private storage directories not accessible to other apps
- OAuth flows use PKCE with S256 code challenge, preventing token theft even if the custom scheme redirect is intercepted
- App interactions with sibling apps (Hue Sync TV, Hue Bluetooth) are first-party same-developer only, not cross-company data sharing
What the app contains
21 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Amplitude
- Firebase Analytics
- Firebase Crashlytics
- Firebase Performance
- Firebase Remote Config
- Firebase Messaging (FCM)
- Firebase Sessions
- Sentry
- Braze
- AppAuth (OpenID)
- Auth0
- Spotify SDK
- Google Play Billing
- flutter_secure_storage
- background_downloader
- Jackson Databind
- Apache Tika
- flutter_callkit_incoming
- WebRTC (cloudwebrtc)
- Google AR Core
- Google ML Kit
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Room | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Amplitude | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Play Billing | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Braze | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Jackson | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Sign-In | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services Location | 12451000 | none confirmed |
Show all 22 librariesShow fewer
Changes since the previous scan
- Version 5.73.0 (versionCode 25353), score 82.
- Score 66 before, 82 after.
- Version 5.61.0 (versionCode 23464) before, 5.73.0 (versionCode 25353) after.
- Score change since version 5.61.0 (versionCode 23464): +16 points.
- Since the previous scan: 21 findings added, 6 removed.
- Version 5.61.0 (versionCode 23464), score 66.
- Score 70 before, 66 after.
- Version 5.40.0 (versionCode: 20071) before, 5.61.0 (versionCode 23464) after.
- Version 5.40.0 (versionCode: 20071), score 70.
- Score 74 before, 70 after.
- Version 5.40.0 (build 20071) before, 5.40.0 (versionCode: 20071) after.
- Version 5.40.0 (build 20071), score 74.
- First public scan of this app.
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Build SHA-256
- e7cf4abe9996677ba591d238de03b86e53295b67cb1371a36cff2d2ba6b2ece3
- Rule pack
- citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1
- Files decompiled
- 15,033
- Scan date
- 12 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.