Can I trust Airbnb?
This app did not meet one of the trust checks that applied to it, with no red flags.
- Best for
- General use with standard privacy expectations
- What it means for you
- The app may include code to pass standard usage and device data to the app developer and integrated services. The breakdown below lists the data types and third parties involved.
- Main concern
- Singular HMAC signing secret hardcoded in Info.plist enables attribution fraud
- The developer's description
- Airbnb is a global platform for booking and managing travel accommodations, experiences, and dining options with host connections and user reviews.
- Third-party services
- 20
- Findings rated low or higher
- 5
Open on the App StoreOpens the app's listing on the App Store in a new tab.
Full findings
Open this scan in your dashboardThe account that ran this scan sees every finding and the Rescan button there.
Trust checks
Secure by Design
StrongStrong security foundation
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.
An HMAC signing secret for a mobile attribution service and a web service API key for a mapping provider are embedded in plaintext in the app bundle. Anyone who downloads the app from the App Store can extract these values and use them to submit forged attribution events or make unauthorized mapping API calls billed to Airbnb. Outside these embedded credentials, the app's security posture is strong: all remote connections require HTTPS with no cleartext exceptions, and keychain storage uses device-bound, non-synced keys compartmentalized by purpose.
Data Minimization
StrongTracking done right
Why this result
The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.
A fraud intelligence SDK is configured to collect location data from the moment the app initializes it, without requiring an additional enabling step. Whether this initialization happens before or after the user is prompted for iOS location permission presents mixed signals without a clear conclusion. On the positive side, the app has explicitly disabled automatic data collection for its analytics and social login SDKs in its configuration files, and the deep-linking SDK includes code confirming it checks tracking authorization status before accessing the advertising identifier.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
The app handles standard travel booking data such as reservations, messages, and payment records. No proprietary data formats or artificial barriers to account closure were identified. No mechanisms that would prevent a user from leaving the platform or taking their booking history elsewhere were found.
Strengths
- All remote connections enforced over HTTPS with no ATS exceptions — no cleartext traffic possible
- Firebase Analytics, Facebook auto-event collection, and Google ad storage all explicitly disabled in production configuration
- AI and ML features processed entirely on-device via Apple Intelligence — no user content sent to cloud AI services
- Login credentials and session tokens are device-bound and cannot be restored to another device or appear in iCloud backups
- Keychain compartmentalized into three named purpose-specific access groups, reducing blast radius if one is compromised
- Cross-app keychain sharing is restricted to Airbnb's own first-party apps under the same developer Team ID
- Jailbreak detection probe present (cydia:// scheme query), indicating active device integrity checking
What the app contains
20 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Singular (mobile attribution)
- Incognia (fraud intelligence)
- FingerprintPro
- ArkoseLabs (bot detection)
- CardinalMobile / Visa 3D Secure 2.0
- Regula DocumentReader (government ID scanning)
- Klarna (BNPL payments)
- Plaid / LinkKit (bank account linking)
- Razorpay (India payments)
- Stripe
- Braintree / PayPal
- Alipay
- WeChat Pay
- Facebook SDK
- Firebase (push notifications only)
- Branch.io (deep linking)
- Google Maps
- Apple Intelligence / FoundationModels
- WebRTC
- Worldline Nordics (payments)
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Airbnb | not recorded | none confirmed |
| ArkoseLabsKit | 2.20.1 | none confirmed |
| CardinalMobile | 2.2.5 | none confirmed |
| DocumentReader | 8.5.5461 | none confirmed |
| DocumentReaderCore | 8.3.14124 | none confirmed |
| FingerprintPro | 2.10.0 | none confirmed |
| KlarnaCore | 2.11.0 | none confirmed |
| KlarnaMobileSDK | 2.11.0 | none confirmed |
| KlarnaPayments | 2.11.0 | none confirmed |
| LinkKit | 6.4.2 | none confirmed |
Show all 15 librariesShow fewer
Changes since the previous scan
- Version 26.32 (build 204837), score 88.
- Score 81 before, 88 after.
- Version 26.16 (Build 204667) before, 26.32 (build 204837) after.
- Score change since version 26.16 (Build 204667): +7 points.
- Since the previous scan: 12 findings added, 16 removed.
- Version 26.16 (Build 204667), score 81.
- First public scan of this app.
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Scan date
- 11 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.