Can I trust IBKR Mobile?
This scan is more than 90 days old.
This app did not meet one of the trust checks that applied to it, with no red flags.
- Best for
- Everyday banking with standard analytics
- What it means for you
- The app includes code to send app usage and crash data to Firebase Analytics and Crashlytics. Financial document processing via MiSnap and QR scanning via ML Kit are handled on-device without sending image data externally. One data storage concern was identified where user data may not be fully protected at rest.
- Main concern
- Hardcoded AES key exposes IBKR session tokens on rooted/compromised devices
- The developer's description
- IBKR Mobile trading app from Interactive Brokers provides real-time access to global markets (stocks, options, futures, forex). Trade, monitor positions, view account balances, and access detailed market data with secure login and instant order execution.
- Third-party services
- 14
- Findings rated low or higher
- 7
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
One criterion not metSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
Data Minimization
StrongTracking done right
Why this result
The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.
Manifest Mismatch
StrongEverything visible
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does: the data categories collected, the companies named in code as their recipients, and the identifiers attached to each. The comparison covers the store listing, the in-app privacy text and any privacy manifest shipped in the build. Every claim compared matched the code here.
No concrete contradictions were identified between what the app's code actually does and what a heavily regulated financial institution bound by SEC and FINRA disclosure requirements would be expected to disclose. All third-party components correspond to standard brokerage app functions that would typically appear in a broker's privacy documentation.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
As a regulated broker subject to FINRA and SEC rules, Interactive Brokers is required to support moving accounts to other institutions via standard industry mechanisms. No proprietary data formats or technical barriers that would prevent moving your account elsewhere were found in the app.
Truly Local
StrongStays on the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone. The check looks for any code written to send personal data to a server, including analytics, crash reporting and advertising code. None was recorded in this build.
The app includes code to send account balances, trading activity, and financial data only to Interactive Brokers' own servers. The anonymous usage data that the app includes code to send to Google contains no financial figures or personal details. Cheque images captured for mobile deposit are processed entirely on your device and never transmitted to the cheque scanning vendor's servers. Bank account linking uses a tokenized callback with no raw account data shared beyond IBKR.
Strengths
- Android KeyStore RSA infrastructure implemented for biometric-gated keys
- HTTPS App Links with autoVerify correctly applied to all primary deep link handlers
- All primary API traffic uses HTTPS and WSS
- ML Kit QR scanning and MiSnap cheque processing performed entirely on-device without transmitting data
What the app contains
14 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Analytics
- Firebase Crashlytics
- Firebase Messaging
- Firebase Installations
- Firebase Sessions
- Google ML Kit
- Google Play Services/Ads
- OkHttp3
- MiTek MiSnap
- Plaid
- Amazon Device Messaging
- AndroidX Credentials
- TradingView
- Apache Commons Imaging
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Mobile Ads (AdMob) | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Sign-In | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Material Components | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Play Core | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Gson | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Firebase | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google ML Kit | not recorded | none confirmed |
Show all 15 librariesShow fewer
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Files decompiled
- 12,780
- Scan date
- 13 June 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
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