# Did not meet TRUSTED criteria This build did not satisfy all of CITT's published criteria for the TRUSTED mark. The full criteria and this app's results are shown below. ## Trust Pillars - **Secure by Design**: Strong. Strong result in this area. - **Data Minimization**: Strong. Strong result in this area. - **Manifest Mismatch**: Not met. Did not meet one criterion in this area. - **User Control**: Strong. Strong result in this area. - **Truly Local**: Not applicable. Does not apply to this app. - **Child-Safe**: Not applicable. Does not apply to this app. --- # Security & Privacy Scorecard ## Evernote ## What This Means for You The binary links crash-reporting and install-attribution services that may send device identifiers and diagnostic data to third parties, but note content stays within Evernote's own infrastructure and is not shared with any third-party analytics or crash-reporting SDK. ## Recommendation: Trustworthy CITT assesses Evernote as trustworthy for personal note-taking and cross-device sync. The main app uses layered encrypted storage and does not share note content with third-party analytics or crash-reporting systems. Crash-reporting and install-attribution libraries are linked, though these operate on device-level diagnostics rather than note content. **Best For:** Personal note-taking and cross-device productivity, where note content is synced through Evernote's own encrypted infrastructure rather than shared with third-party data services. ## Method and Limitations Static analysis only. CITT reviewed the code of this build without running the app, so runtime behavior was not observed. The findings below describe the analyzed build and may not reflect server-side controls or later versions. CITT makes no determination about compliance with any law or platform policy; it reports what the artifacts contain and cites the published guidance so a reader can compare. ## Key Findings **Data Security:** 0 findings **Network Security:** 0 findings **Code Safety:** 2 findings (2 low) **Privacy:** 0 findings ## Privacy Concerns ### What Leaves the Device - Note content: synced to Evernote's own servers for cross-device access via an encrypted connection - Crash and error data: the binary links Firebase Crashlytics and Sentry; these services may receive diagnostic reports when errors occur (runtime transmission was not observed) - Install attribution data: the binary links Bending Spoons attribution and Apple AdServices; these may correlate install events with device or account identifiers (runtime transmission was not observed) - Device identifiers and carrier name: the binary links RNDeviceInfo, which makes device-level information available within the app; whether this data is sent to external services was not confirmed through runtime observation ### What Stays on the Device No sensitive data was identified as processed exclusively on the device in this build. The binary does not link AppTrackingTransparency, so the device advertising identifier (IDFA) is not accessed by this build and remains outside the app's reach. ### Third-Party Data Sharing **Third parties that may receive data from the app:** - Firebase Crashlytics - crash and error reporting - Sentry - error monitoring - Bending Spoons - install attribution - Apple AdServices (AAAttribution) - install attribution - Google Sign-In (GTMAppAuth) - authentication ## Understanding the Scores **Security:** 83/100 **Privacy:** 84/100 ### Security Breakdown - **Data Security:** 83/100. The main app uses layered encrypted storage and biometric-protected secure storage for sensitive items. The share extension's local storage could be strengthened to match the same level of protection. - **Network Security:** 80/100. Communication with Evernote's servers uses encrypted connections; the binary's transport security configuration includes some exceptions that could be narrowed for more uniform enforcement. - **Code Safety:** 88/100. The binary links well-maintained third-party components. Two low-severity findings relate to non-production infrastructure references compiled into the production build. ### Privacy Breakdown - **Data Collection:** 84/100. The binary links attribution and crash-reporting libraries that may send device-level data to third parties. Note content is not shared with any third-party SDK. - **Data Sharing:** 91/100. Note content stays within Evernote's own infrastructure. The binary does not link advertising SDKs or data-broker services. - **User Control:** 88/100. An in-app consent screen with a withdrawal path for third-party tracking is present in the binary. The device advertising identifier is not accessed by this build. ## Positive Security Features - Firebase Analytics is disabled in this build; no analytics data is configured to be sent to Google's analytics infrastructure - Note content stays within Evernote's own infrastructure and is not shared with any third-party SDK - The binary does not link AppTrackingTransparency; the device advertising identifier (IDFA) is not accessed - The main app uses layered encrypted storage and biometric-protected secure storage for sensitive items - The App Group container is restricted to first-party extensions under the same Team ID; no third-party SDK access to shared storage is configured - An in-app consent screen with a withdrawal path for third-party tracking technologies is present in the binary ## Areas for Improvement ### Disclosure observations Observations about disclosure, each stated against the published guidance so a reader can compare: 1. **App Privacy Manifest Coverage** Apple's guidance (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/privacy_manifest_files) recommends an app privacy manifest (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy) listing required-reason APIs and declared data types. The binary links attribution and crash-reporting SDKs; adding or expanding a privacy manifest could make the App Store privacy label more complete and easier for users to compare against the binary. Whether the current privacy label fully reflects the linked SDKs could not be determined from the binary alone. 2. **Non-Production Domains in Production Entitlements** The signed entitlements file registers staging and test domains as universal link handlers. Apple's associated-domains documentation recommends keeping entitlement lists scoped to production domains. If any listed staging domain were to have its DNS reused by another party in the future, iOS routing behavior for those links could be affected. Removing non-production entries from the production build would narrow this surface. ### Security Enhancements 1. **Share Extension Storage Protection** Strengthening the share extension's local storage to use the same level of encrypted protection as the main app would provide more consistent coverage when note content is captured through the system share sheet. 2. **App Transport Security Exceptions** Reviewing and narrowing the App Transport Security exception list in the binary would enforce encrypted connections more uniformly across the app and its extensions. ## Technical Context **App Type:** Productivity - note-taking and cloud sync (sensitive data) **Classes Analyzed:** 0 **Third-Party Services:** 18 **Context Tags:** productivity, notes, sensitive_data, camera, cloud_sync, ads --- ## About This Analysis This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. The analysis is static code review of iOS applications, intended to help people make informed decisions about app security and privacy. ### App Details **Developer:** Evernote Corporation **Version:** 11.28.3 (build 1251911) **Analysis Date:** 2026-08-13 **Package:** com.evernote.iPhone.Evernote ### Analysis Limitations - Static analysis only (code review without running the app) - Based on IPA version 11.28.3 analyzed on 2026-08-13 - May not reflect server-side security controls - Cannot detect all runtime behaviors