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Missouri Temu lawsuit: what the petition says the app collects

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 6 min read

Last updated: 2026-10-13

On October 13, 2026, Missouri Attorney General Catherine L. Hanaway filed a petition for injunction, civil penalties and other relief in the Circuit Court of Cole County, case 26AC-CC00672, against PDD Holdings Inc. (formerly Pinduoduo Inc.), Whaleco Inc. d/b/a Temu, and Temu Payments Inc. The claims arise under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) and Missouri common law; the MMPA's prohibition of deceptive and unfair practices is § 407.020 RSMo. The State demands a jury trial. The data allegations in this Temu lawsuit are technical (manifest permissions, installed-app queries, Wi-Fi scans, an on-device patching SDK) and are based on a forensic review the State commissioned. They are allegations; no court has ruled on them.

What does the Missouri Temu lawsuit allege the app collects?

Precise location, nearby Wi-Fi networks, the list of installed apps, the accounts stored on the phone, and a set of device identifiers. Missouri states that these technical allegations come from its own experts (¶ 16):

Except where specifically noted, all factual allegations in this Petition about the technical design, functionality, and features of the Temu app are based on Missouri's retained expert forensic investigation.

In the same paragraph, Missouri states that the allegations "do not rely or depend on any third party reports or analysis" and names the Grizzly Research short-seller report of September 6, 2023. The main data allegations, each as Missouri pleads it:

Data or behavior What Missouri alleges Petition
Precise location The app obtains "real-time GPS location within an accuracy of at least 10 feet" ¶ 86
Location permission ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION removed from the Android manifest no later than April 2023, restored in version 2.4.1 on or about September 8, 2023, two days after the short-seller report ¶¶ 127, 131
Wi-Fi ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, which, per the petition, enables collection of the name and signal strength of connected and nearby networks ¶ 89
Installed apps getInstalledPackages and package queries returning app names, "likely install and update timestamps" and versions; later queries target named apps such as WhatsApp, Signal, PayPal and Klarna ¶¶ 101–105
Copies of other apps An "APK upload handler": code that allowed copies of third-party apps to be sent "to unknown servers for unknown purposes" ¶ 106
Accounts GET_ACCOUNTS, present "at different points in time" ¶ 107
Clipboard and device identifiers Clipboard contents, IMSI, MAC address, IMEI and Android Advertising ID ¶¶ 111–115
Camera and microphone CAMERA and RECORD_AUDIO permissions "not adequately disclosed to users" ¶ 92
Other running apps and telephony ActivityManager.getRunningTasks and TelephonyManager.listen() ¶¶ 93–100

On location, Missouri alleges that the app "continually acquired data points" that allowed precise location to be determined while the fine-location permission was absent from the manifest (¶ 87). Version 2.4.1 is the only Temu version number in the petition. No tested build is identified in the petition by version or date, and no exhibits are attached to the filed PDF, so the expert report is outside the public filing.

What does Missouri allege about on-device patching and evasion?

Missouri alleges that "multiple versions of the Temu app" have a patching capability through "Manwe", an SDK described in the petition as "also found in the malicious versions of Pinduoduo", which lets the app "patch the app on the device, rather than through releasing updates via the Apple App Store or Google Play Store" (¶¶ 116–117). A string command, "QWERTY", is alleged to "deactivate dynamic patches that had previously been managed by the Manwe SDK" (¶ 122). Missouri also alleges root detection, a Debug.isDebuggerConnected() check (¶¶ 133–137), and "at least three layers of encryption beyond ordinary TLS" on traffic to Temu's servers, of which the State's experts decrypted "some (but not all)" (¶¶ 145–147). On shared code, Missouri alleges that Temu and Pinduoduo "have always had an overlap of multiple SDKs, with an overlap of 34 separate and distinct SDKs at their historical peak" (¶ 152).

On consent, Missouri compares the technical findings with Temu's privacy policies of October 17, 2022, February 13, 2023 and May 12, 2025 (¶ 157). From the May 2025 policy, as quoted in the petition: "We collect your approximate location based on your technical information (e.g., IP address)". Per the petition, installed-app queries and telephony data appear in none of the three policies. On children, Missouri quotes Temu's terms ("[children] under 13 years are not permitted to use Temu or the Services") and alleges that the defendants "possess actual knowledge that children under the age of 13 are on the Temu app" (¶ 176).

What penalties does Missouri seek against Temu?

Five counts: deception, unfair practices, concealment or suppression of material facts, and misrepresentation under § 407.020, plus unjust enrichment. In the prayer for relief, Missouri asks for restitution, a permanent injunction, "civil penalties of $1,000 per violation of the MMPA", costs and fees under § 407.130, an additional 10% of restitution under § 407.140.3, and joint and several liability. The penalty cap is in § 407.100.6: "not more than one thousand dollars per violation", with no penalty where the defendant shows a bona fide error despite reasonable procedures. Missouri pleads that each instance of the practices "constitutes a separate violation" and describes the defendants as selling to "thousands of Missourians" (¶¶ 250, 253). No number of violations is stated in the petition.

Hanaway is quoted in the Attorney General's release: "My advice to all Missourians is to delete this app. Temu lied to you, stole your data, packaged it up, and potentially delivered it to the CCP." In the petition, the transfer to China is pleaded as an inference: "it can reasonably be assumed that the data Temu is illicitly collecting from Missouri users is being sent to and used by the Chinese government" (¶ 22). KOMU reported that it had asked Temu for comment and had received no response.

Is there a Temu lawsuit claim form?

Missouri's case is a state enforcement action, and no claim form is named in the release. From the release: Missourians "who believe they have been affected by Temu's business practices may submit a complaint online at ago.mo.gov or by calling 800-392-8222." Any restitution is payable to the State for distribution under § 407.100.4.

Which other states have sued Temu?

The attorneys general of Arkansas, Nebraska, Kentucky and Arizona announced Temu suits before Missouri, each in its own release:

State Announced Court (per the release) Basis named in the release
Arkansas June 25, 2024 Cleburne County Circuit Court Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Personal Information Protection Act
Nebraska June 12, 2025 not named consumer protection violations
Kentucky July 17, 2025 Woodford County Circuit Court unlawful data collection, privacy, counterfeiting
Arizona December 2, 2025 Maricopa County Superior Court Consumer Fraud Act
Missouri October 13, 2026 Cole County Circuit Court Merchandising Practices Act

These four suits appear here as announced; their current status is on each state court's docket.

The same outside firm appears in three of the suits. Nachawati Law Group of Dallas and Wade Kilpela Slade are listed as co-counsel in the Missouri petition, with pro hac vice admission forthcoming (page 103). Arizona selected Nachawati Law Group for its Temu case under a contingency-fee contract in which the firm is described as representing Arkansas in its Temu litigation.

On the Nebraska suit, a Temu spokesperson told Sourcing Journal that the allegations "are without merit and appear to be a rehash of misinformation circulated online, much of it originating from a short-seller."

Temu app permissions: what a scan and a capture show

I published a teardown of the Temu app on July 30, 2026 (updated September 29), covering Android 4.39.0 and iOS 4.71.0. Two findings bear on Missouri's allegations. On Android, the app can replace Java methods with native code at runtime, gated by a server-side flag. Which methods were replaced is outside the capture; the observed uses were crash fixes and performance work. Telemetry sent to pftka-us.temu.com/clim/ is encrypted with a custom cipher on top of TLS. The plaintext recovered in the teardown was device, session, performance and navigation telemetry. From the teardown: "No sensitive personal content was observed." Because 2.4.1 is the petition's only version number, the builds behind its allegations and the teardown builds may differ. The location, Wi-Fi and installed-app allegations are outside the teardown's findings.

In a static scan of a current build, the manifest permissions named in the petition (ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, GET_ACCOUNTS) and QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES are recorded as declared or absent. References to the installed-app methods getInstalledPackages and getInstalledApplications, root-detection strings, dynamic code loading references and the SDKs in the binary are listed, each with its file and line. Presence shows the code is in the build; only a capture shows that data was sent. In a capture of a shopping session on a test device, any coordinates, Wi-Fi identifiers or app list sent are recorded with the receiving host and whether the request came before or after a permission prompt. Where a body is encrypted on top of TLS, as Temu's telemetry is, the host and the request are recorded, and the content is readable only once the cipher is reversed (as in the Temu teardown). Each capture is of one build on one device: the 2023 builds, server-side use of the data and on-device patches that did not run in that session are outside its scope. See what a scan checks and the limits of a scan.

Related: EFF's study of four ad SDKs that send precise location and Connecticut's ban on selling precise geolocation data.

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