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Meta localhost lawsuit: claims proceed, pen register dropped

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 5 min read

Last updated: 2026-11-17

On 2026-11-02 Judge Rita F. Lin of the Northern District of California denied most of Meta Platforms' second motion to dismiss in In re Meta Android Privacy Litigation, No. 3:25-cv-04674-RFL, the consolidated putative class action alleging that the Meta Pixel in Android browsers sent the _fbp cookie to the Facebook and Instagram apps through localhost ports. Under the amended order (Dkt. 160), the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) § 638.51 pen register claim is dismissed with prejudice, and the wiretap, eavesdropping, computer fraud and privacy claims proceed. Dkt. 160 replaced an order filed the same day (Dkt. 159) with a corrected answer date. This is a ruling on the pleadings, with no finding of fact. The mechanism, the ports and the first order of May 11, 2026 are in the earlier post on the Meta localhost tracking lawsuit.

What did the court decide on Meta's second motion to dismiss?

The order rules on the claims against Meta only. Google, the co-defendant, answered the First Amended Complaint on 2026-07-15.

Claim against Meta Order of 2026-11-02 Ground in the order
Wiretap Act (ECPA); CIPA §§ 631(a), 632(a) Proceeds The Modified Pixel is plausibly a different "device" or "machine" (pp. 2–3)
CIPA § 635 Proceeds No separate discussion; "All other claims survive dismissal" (p. 5)
CDAFA, Cal. Penal Code § 502 Proceeds Alleged circumvention of Android's sandboxing (p. 3)
Intrusion upon seclusion; California Constitution Proceeds "For the reasons stated in the prior motion to dismiss order" (p. 4)
CIPA § 638.51 (pen register) Dismissed with prejudice, without leave to amend Plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal in light of SB 690 (p. 3)

From page 1: "Although Plaintiffs may have consented to the operation of the standard Pixel, the scope of their consent plausibly did not extend to the operation of the Modified Pixel." Judge Lin measured the scope of consent against the Restatement (Second) of Torts, where consent to a fight is ineffective against a hidden set of brass knuckles (page 2):

Just as generic consent to a "fight" does not encompass unexpected dangers like brass knuckles, generic consent to sharing data that "helps us match" a profile does not necessarily encompass unexpectedly invasive de-anonymization via an undisclosed backdoor in one's mobile phone.

Meta argued that consent to the standard Pixel covered the interception of browsing data, and that the wiretap claims require the interception itself to be unauthorized. Judge Lin held it plausible that the Modified Pixel is a different "device" or "machine" under the Wiretap Act and CIPA. She added that even if the interception fell within the scope of consent, "Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the harm from the collection of account information through the Modified Pixel is inseverable from the harm caused by the standard collection of browsing information, and thus that Meta is liable for the entire harm" (page 3).

What did the order say about CDAFA and Android sandboxing?

The claim under the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA) proceeds on the allegation that Meta acted without permission "by circumventing Android's sandboxing to de-anonymize Plaintiffs' real-time browsing activity by associating it with their Meta accounts" (page 3). Meta compared its conduct to a person permitted to enter a store and collect the day's cash, who does not become a thief by leaving through a door marked "No Exit". Judge Lin answered (page 4): "Meta's conduct is more like the manager who is permitted to take periodic bonuses from the cash register, but instead empties the entire register every night."

On damage or loss, Judge Lin held (page 4) that plaintiffs' interest in Meta's "allegedly unjustly earned profits is sufficient to constitute damage or loss." From the order: "District courts are split on this issue." She followed her own ruling in Smith v. Rack Room Shoes (N.D. Cal., August 4, 2025) over Dellasala v. Samba TV (N.D. Cal., April 21, 2026), a case over viewing data alleged to have been collected from Sony televisions. From the order: "Nothing in Dellasala or the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784, 792–94 (9th Cir. 2025), compels a different reading of CDAFA's definition of damage or loss."

How did SB 690 end the pen register claim?

SB 690, signed 2026-09-30 (chaptered text), makes a § 638.51 claim over conduct on a website or mobile app an Attorney General action from 2027-01-01. The change applies to pending claims in actions commenced in the two years before that date. From the order, page 3: "In light of SB 690, which amends Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(d) to remove the private right of action for certain pen register claims, Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of their claim under Cal. Penal Code § 638.51. (Dkt. No. 156 at 1.)" The case was filed on 2025-06-03, inside the two-year window. The dismissal rests on the plaintiffs' non-opposition, two months before SB 690's operative date; the order contains no ruling on how the retroactivity clause applies. Dkt. 156, the plaintiffs' filing, is not in the public RECAP archive. Sections 631 and 632 keep their private right of action under SB 690, and the claims under them proceed.

What happens next in In re Meta Android Privacy Litigation?

Meta's answer is due 2026-11-30, after a stipulated extension granted on 2026-11-13 (Dkt. 163, on the court's case page). Under the schedule of June 24, 2026 (Dkt. 128), the class certification motion is due 2027-10-15 and the hearing is set for 2028-02-29. The _fbp cookie is also at issue in the Meta Pixel healthcare case, where four classes of Facebook users were certified on 2026-10-30.

What does an app scan show for localhost tracking?

One rule in my Android scan matches 127.0.0.1 or localhost followed by port 29009, 29010, 30102 or 30103 in the dex code. Those are the ports documented for Yandex's apps by the researchers who disclosed the technique in June 2025 (localmess.github.io). The ports alleged against the Facebook and Instagram apps (12387 over HTTP and WebSocket, then 12580–12585 over WebRTC) are outside that rule's list; finding them takes reading the decompiled code. A rule match and a port found in the decompiled code are each evidence of presence in the binary only. Transmission is established by a capture of a browser and the app on the same phone: a Pixel page load, a request or WebRTC packet to 127.0.0.1 that contains the _fbp value, then the app's next request to Meta. The researchers reported that the Pixel stopped sending to localhost on June 3, 2025, so a capture made now is evidence about current builds only.

Every static finding is linked to its file and line, and every traffic finding to its capture. What a scan checks and the limits of a scan are on the methodology page. I run app tracking investigations for lawyers and the researchers working with them, on one app or a list in bulk. Sign up for a CanITrustThat account to run your own research, let us run an investigation for you, or read the app teardowns.

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