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San Diego sues AppLovin over ads and tracking in kids games

Filip LuchianencoUpdated 7 min read

Last updated: 2026-10-13

On October 5, 2026, San Diego County Counsel, suing in the name of the People of the State of California, filed a lawsuit against AppLovin Corporation in San Diego Superior Court under California's False Advertising Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) and Unfair Competition Law (§ 17200). The County alleges that AppLovin's software development kit (SDK) served sexual, gambling, alcohol and cannabis ads inside mobile games rated for children, and collected device data from children after AppLovin removed its COPPA flag in September 2024. The complaint is linked from Supervisor Terra Lawson-Remer's release. The County's allegations described below are untested in court.

Per the County News Center release, the case is one of the first three filed by the County Counsel's new Consumer Fairness and Public Protection Division, together with suits against Roblox and Polymaker. The case number is absent from the complaint and from both County releases.

What does the San Diego County lawsuit against AppLovin allege?

AppLovin runs MAX, an ad mediation SDK, and AppDiscovery, its own ad network. Game developers add the AppLovin SDK to their apps to show ads. The County alleges that "As of 2025, AppLovin's SDK was integrated into 73% of the most-downloaded mobile games that feature advertisements" (¶24) and that AppLovin's platform reaches "over one billion daily active users" (¶2).

The allegations fall into two sets. The first is ad content. County counsel tested games in January 2025 on "a Samsung tablet belonging to a six-year-old with Google Family Link parental controls enabled" (¶29), and in July and August 2026 on another Android device set up for a six-year-old with Family Link (¶35).

According to the complaint, ads for PolyBuzz, an AI chat app rated M for Mature, and for 8 Ball Strike: Win Real Cash, a real-money game rated 18+, appeared in Rope Savior 3D, rated E for Everyone (¶30–31). The County alleges that ads for cannabis gummies appeared in Hexa Sort (¶35), and ads for wine and cannabis vapes in the E-rated games Car Crash Arena: Sandbox and Cut the Rope: Time Travel (¶36 and Figures 26–27 of the complaint's image compendium). According to the complaint, all of these ads were served through MAX and AppDiscovery (¶41). The County also alleges ads with fake close and skip buttons (¶50), and that 8 Ball Strike was installed in a single tap from inside Rope Savior 3D on the Family Link tablet (¶53).

The second is data collection. The County alleges that the SDK collects, from children's devices, precise location even when location services are off, the list of installed apps, accelerometer and gyroscope readings, and "CPU and GPU specifications, battery information, and exact boot-up time to the millisecond" (¶68). It alleges that where the advertising ID is zeroed on a child's device, AppLovin assigns "a unique Compass Random Token ('CRT') to each device – including children's devices marked Do Not Track – that persists across different applications" (¶73–75). Location data sent by ad SDKs at the network level is the subject of the EFF study of ad SDKs and precise location.

What was AppLovin's COPPA flag, and when was it removed?

Before version 13.0.0 of the SDK, developers could call setIsAgeRestrictedUser to mark a user as a child. The County alleges that "When activated, this COPPA flag would suppress the SDK's behavioral tracking, limit data collection, and disable targeted advertising altogether" and that AppLovin removed it in September 2024, citing the SDK changelog for version 13.0.0 (¶43–44). The first line of AppLovin's release notes for Android SDK 13.0.0, published September 15, 2024, is "Removed COPPA support." The sentence "AppLovin age-restriction settings are not supported as of AppLovin SDK 13.0.0 for Android & iOS" is in Unity's LevelPlay documentation for the AppLovin adapter.

AppLovin's current position is published on its MAX privacy page for Android. From that page:

Consistent with these requirements, setIsAgeRestrictedUser is no longer supported, as you may not initialize or use the SDK in any way if the user qualifies a "child." Update your apps to the latest SDK to comply with AppLovin's policies.

Under the same page's terms, iOS apps in the Kids category and Google Play apps that target children under the Families Ads and Monetization Policy "may not use the AppLovin Services at all", and in mixed-audience apps, if a user "qualifies as a 'child,'" the developer "should not initialize or use the AppLovin SDK in any way." The County's theory is that AppLovin promotes E-rated games such as Block Blast and Pixel Flow! on its own website while placing the duty to exclude children on developers (¶45–46), and that AppLovin's service is directed to children or AppLovin has actual knowledge that it collects data from them (¶92). COPPA is one of the laws the County pleads as a predicate of its Unfair Competition Law claim; the amended COPPA Rule has applied in full since April 22, 2026.

Which allegations rest on the County's testing, and which on short-seller reports?

The ad-content section rests mainly on County counsel's own testing. For the data-collection allegations, the County cites reports published in 2025 by Fuzzy Panda Research and Muddy Waters, and verification by the investigations firm Permanent Record Research (¶70, ¶75–78); for the dark-pattern allegations, it cites Fuzzy Panda and Culper Research (¶50, ¶52). In the complaint, Fuzzy Panda, Culper and Muddy Waters are "investment firms"; CNBC described Muddy Waters as "the third short-selling firm" to publish a report on AppLovin in 2025, after Fuzzy Panda and Culper.

Allegation Evidence cited in the complaint Complaint ¶
Adult, gambling, alcohol and cannabis ads in games rated for children County counsel testing, January 2025 and July–August 2026; Fuzzy Panda tests on child-configured devices ¶27–41
setIsAgeRestrictedUser removed in SDK 13.0.0 (September 2024) AppLovin changelog and integration guide; Fuzzy Panda ¶43–45
Fake close and skip buttons, inaction recorded as an ad interaction Fuzzy Panda, Culper Research ¶50
Install of an 18+ game from inside an E-rated game on a Family Link tablet County counsel testing ¶53
Device data list, including location with location services off Muddy Waters, Fuzzy Panda ¶68–70
Compass Random Token persisting across apps on child devices Fuzzy Panda, Muddy Waters, verified per the complaint by Permanent Record Research ¶73–76
Persistent Identity Graph Muddy Waters ¶78

Source: complaint, People of the State of California v. AppLovin Corporation, San Diego Superior Court, October 5, 2026.

The ads shown on a test device are visible in a screen recording of that device. Whether the same token value is sent from two apps on one device is visible in a capture of both, where the request body is readable. What AppLovin links to that token on its servers, and what it does with the device data once received, are outside any device capture.

The first cause of action is under the FAL, the second under the UCL. For the UCL's unlawful prong, the County lists predicates including Penal Code § 313.1 (harmful matter to minors), Business and Professions Code § 22580 (ads to minors), Section 5 of the FTC Act, COPPA, the CCPA, the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Penal Code § 502) and the California Invasion of Privacy Act's pen register provision (Penal Code § 638.51) (¶109). For the pen register theory, the County cites Greenley v. Kochava (¶87). Under SB 690, signed September 30, 2026, the Attorney General is the only party who can bring a § 637.2 action over § 638.51 conduct in apps from January 1, 2027; the County pleads § 638.51 as a UCL predicate. The County also cites Mitchell v. AppLovin Corp., No. 24CV434574 (Santa Clara Superior Court), a privacy case with CIPA claims in which the court overruled a demurrer on March 23, 2026 (¶85).

The County asks for an injunction requiring AppLovin to "restore effective mechanisms for identifying child users, honor Do Not Track designations on children's devices, implement reasonable age-assurance measures, and cease its deceptive user-interface practices" (¶118). Age assurance at the store level is the subject of the state app-store age signal laws and of Google Play's age signals API.

The County also asks for restitution (¶119), civil penalties of "up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation of the UCL" (¶120), and civil penalties under the FAL (prayer, item 3). Per ¶120, each ad served to a child in violation of law, each collection of a child's personal information without parental consent, and each coerced or fabricated interaction billed to an advertiser is a separate violation.

What has AppLovin said?

Bloomberg, via Claims Journal, reported that AppLovin "didn't immediately respond to a request for comment." AppLovin's policy statement, quoted in the complaint (¶67) and also on the MAX privacy page, is "AppLovin does not knowingly collect personal information from children or serve advertisements to children." AppLovin CEO Adam Foroughi is quoted in the complaint: "[w]e do not track children's data" (¶102). According to the complaint, the SEC's Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit opened an investigation into AppLovin's device fingerprinting practices in October 2025 (¶71). On AppLovin's Q2 2026 earnings call on August 5, 2026, CFO Matt Stumpf said: "It was a voluntary request, which we never deemed material. The SEC has recently advised us that it concluded its inquiry with no recommended action."

What would a scan and capture of a game with the AppLovin SDK show?

The County's ad-content allegations turn on what a child's device received, and its data allegations turn on what the SDK sent. Both can be recorded for a given game on a test device. Three facts are visible in a static scan of an Android build: whether the AppLovin SDK classes are present, the SDK version where it is present in the build, and whether setIsAgeRestrictedUser is referenced in the app's own code. The AppLovin SDK is a CITT finding in apps whose Play listing is child-directed and in apps inferred to be for children from the listing (an Everyone rating plus child-audience cues). In a network capture, each request to AppLovin hosts such as ms.applovin.com is logged with its timestamp and the device fields in each readable request body, and the ads shown on screen are recorded in the same session. SDK presence in a binary means the code is there; what was sent is established by a capture alone. What AppLovin does with the data on its servers is outside a capture.

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