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Can I trust Raiffeisen Bank SK?

unTRUSTED 64 Android Version 2.5.0 (build 341) Scanned build downloaded: Store version released: Last checked: sk.raiffeisen.ib.androidwrapper Scanned

This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.

Avoid if
Users who primarily bank on public Wi-Fi
What it means for you
No advertising or behavioral tracking SDKs are bundled in build 341. Authentication keys and barcode scans remain on-device. Firebase Crashlytics is present for crash reporting; the code encrypts push notification content before handing it to the Firebase SDK, so Firebase does not see message content. The code for some banking requests may apply less protection than expected on public Wi-Fi.
Main concern
WebView accepts any SSL certificate, enabling trivial banking session interception
The developer's description
The Raiffeisen Bank application allows you to access the bank's website and Internet Banking using a mobile device. Features include account information, payments, standing orders, barcode/QR/IBAN scanning, card management, biometric login, and ATM locator.
Third-party services
14
Findings rated low or higher
9

How the score and the label work

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Full findings

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Trust checks

  • Secure by Design

    An item rated high or above is open

    Security gaps detected

    Why this result

    This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.

  • Data Minimization

    One criterion not met

    Tracking lacks clear disclosure

    Why this result

    This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.

  • Manifest Mismatch

    One criterion not met

    Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

    Why this result

    The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

  • User Control

    Strong

    No lock-in

    Why this result

    The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

    The app is a portal to a regulated banking service operating under European banking law and GDPR, which grant users the right to access, obtain, and delete their financial data. The app stores no proprietary data formats on the device and creates no app-specific barriers to leaving the service.

Strengths

  • Login sessions are protected by hardware-backed biometric keys stored in AndroidKeyStore that never leave the secure element
  • No advertising networks or behavioral tracking SDKs are present
  • All traffic uses HTTPS with cleartext HTTP blocked at the OS level, including inside the banking WebView
  • App data cannot be extracted via ADB backup or Android Cloud Backup
  • Barcode and document scanning (ML Kit) processes data on-device only with no external data transmission
  • The code encrypts push notification payloads end-to-end before handing them to the Firebase SDK, so the Firebase SDK is given only encrypted payloads
  • Runtime integrity protection detects tampering and terminates the app before any UI or data is loaded

What the app contains

  • 14 services

    Third-party services the scan names in the build:

    • Firebase Crashlytics
    • Firebase Messaging (FCM)
    • Firebase Installations
    • Firebase Sessions
    • Firebase Remote Config
    • Google ML Kit (Barcode Scanning)
    • Google ML Kit (Text Recognition)
    • Google Play Services (TapAndPay / Google Pay)
    • Google Play Services (Maps)
    • OkHttp3
    • BouncyCastle
    • Radaee PDF Reader
    • Lottie
    • DexGuard

Libraries

Libraries in the build of Raiffeisen Bank SK
LibraryVersionAdvisory
Lottienot recordednone confirmed
Datatransportnot recordednone confirmed
Google Sign-In12451000none confirmed
Google Play Services12451000none confirmed
Material Componentsnot recordednone confirmed
Gsonnot recordednone confirmed
Firebase12451000none confirmed
Google ML Kitnot recordednone confirmed
OkHttp5.3.2none confirmed
Okionot recordednone confirmed
Show all 14 libraries

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Build SHA-256
3345c0148fbd4c9ccbdf07611cd32f7e0e4652f881663b4ef16eb5a3ce6c74cd
Rule pack
citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1
Files decompiled
13,790
Scan date
16 September 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.

Developer response

No response is published for this app.

Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.