Scan results

    Interbank APP

    Android

    Mobile banking app from Interbank, a Peruvian financial institution. Provides account access, fund transfers, bill payment, peer-to-peer transfers via PLIN, card management, and biometric authentication.

    unTRUSTED

    This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or carries a red flag.

    The five trust checks

    Truly LocalNot applicable
    CITT SCORE
    64
    out of 100
    unTRUSTED

    Quick Verdict

    Best for: Interbank customers banking on the go

    What It Means For You

    Core financial data, including account balances, transactions, and card details, is processed on Interbank's own servers and is not passed to any analytics platform. Install and usage data is shared with services including Firebase Analytics, AppsFlyer, Adobe, and Microsoft Clarity. Camera-based features like barcode scanning use on-device processing with no data leaving the device.

    Method and Limitations

    Static analysis only. CITT reviewed the code of this build without running the app, so runtime behavior was not observed. The findings below describe the analyzed build and may not reflect server-side controls or later versions. CITT makes no determination about compliance with any law or platform policy; it reports what the artifacts contain and cites the published guidance so a reader can compare.

    How CITT scores an app

    Findings (11)

    Data Security

    1 total
    1 Low

    Network Security

    1 total
    1 High

    Code Security

    8 total
    1 High
    5 Medium
    2 Low

    Privacy

    1 total
    1 High

    Third-Party Services

    IziPay Payment SDK, Thales TPC SDK, FacePhi Selphi, FacePhi SelphiD, ThreatMetrix TrustDefender (LexisNexis), IO SRO Collector (unknown vendor), Google Firebase (Analytics, Crashlytics, FCM, Remote Config), AppsFlyer, Adobe Marketing Mobile (MobileCore), Adobe Experience Platform Assurance, IBM Acoustic Mobile Push, Microsoft Clarity, Qualtrics, Dynatrace, AWS Cognito, Google ML Kit, Google Maps, Samsung Pay, Mastercard Sonic, Lottie (Airbnb)

    Security Strengths

    • HTTPS enforced across all API endpoints with no cleartext traffic permitted anywhere in the app
    • App backup is disabled, blocking ADB and cloud backup data extraction attacks
    • Biometric authentication is bound to hardware-backed Android KeyStore keys — the strongest Android biometric pattern
    • 15 native JNI security checks resist Java-layer hooking and Frida bypass attempts
    • Continuous runtime integrity monitoring polls every 2–5 seconds and hard-kills the process on failure
    What changed since the last scan

    Version diff is on the Developer plan. See developer plans.

    Context Tags

    financial
    sensitive data
    location
    camera
    ads

    Package

    pe.com.interbank.mobilebanking

    Version

    23.1 (versionCode 1843)

    Analysis Date

    Aug 13, 2026

    Classes Analyzed

    3,200

    Was this analysis helpful?

    Feedback helps us improve our analysis

    View on Play Store

    Recommendation: Use With Caution

    Build 334 functions as a capable mobile banking client for existing Interbank customers. Core financial account data and transactions are handled on Interbank-controlled infrastructure with HTTPS enforced across those connections. The principal concerns in this build are a payment component that ships with network validation disabled and a debug build configuration, and six analytics, attribution, and session-recording SDKs initialized at launch without an observed consent mechanism, which is inconsistent with the Play Store Data Safety declaration.

    Key Findings

    Data Security: 1 finding (1 low)

    Network Security: 1 finding (1 high)

    Code Safety: 8 findings (1 high, 5 medium, 2 low)

    Privacy: 1 finding (1 high)

    Privacy Concerns

    What Leaves the Device

    • Device identifiers and install attribution signals: the AppsFlyer SDK is bundled and initialized at launch without an observed consent gate; runtime data egress was not confirmed but is consistent with AppsFlyer's standard configuration
    • Behavioral and session data: the Adobe MobileCore SDK is initialized with no observed consent check and configured to reach Adobe Experience Cloud services
    • Screen-recording sessions: the Microsoft Clarity SDK is present in the build and may share recorded session data with Microsoft servers; this was not confirmed at runtime
    • Geofencing and proximity data: the IBM Acoustic Mobile Push SDK is bundled and may share location-derived data with IBM; runtime transmission was not observed
    • Device fingerprint and risk signals: the ThreatMetrix TrustDefender (LexisNexis) SDK is present and may share device intelligence with LexisNexis; this was not confirmed at runtime
    • Call metadata and installed application inventory: the IO SRO Collector SDK is initialized and may share this data with an unidentified vendor; runtime transmission was not confirmed

    What Stays on the Device

    • Text recognition, barcode scanning, and face detection: handled by Google ML Kit, which processes these tasks on the device with no evidenced data egress
    • Biometric authentication data: managed by the device's hardware-backed secure storage and not transmitted off the device

    Third-Party Data Sharing

    Third parties that may receive data from the app:

    • AppsFlyer - install attribution and behavioral analytics
    • Adobe Experience Cloud - behavioral analytics and in-app messaging
    • Microsoft Clarity - session recording
    • IBM Acoustic - location-based push notifications
    • ThreatMetrix TrustDefender (LexisNexis) - device fingerprinting for fraud detection
    • IO SRO Collector - device intelligence (vendor not identified in the analyzed build)
    • Google Firebase - crash reporting, push notifications, remote configuration
    • Dynatrace - application performance monitoring

    Understanding the Scores

    Security: 65/100
    Privacy: 64/100

    Security Breakdown

    • Data Security: 73/100. Core banking data is processed on Interbank's infrastructure. A bundled cloud configuration file in the build contains identity pool identifiers that could support account enumeration attempts against the associated cloud service; this scenario was not tested at runtime.
    • Network Security: 60/100. Interbank API connections enforce HTTPS without cleartext exceptions. The analyzed build's IziPay payment SDK component configures its network client to accept any server identity, creating a potential gap for payment-specific traffic when the device is on an untrusted network; this was not confirmed at runtime.
    • Code Safety: 73/100. The build includes hardware-backed biometric security, native integrity checks, and runtime process monitoring that polls at short intervals. Several development and debug components are present in the production build, expanding the accessible surface beyond what is required for banking functionality.

    Privacy Breakdown

    • Data Collection: 71/100. The build bundles multiple analytics, attribution, and session-recording SDKs initialized at launch. Google ML Kit processes recognition tasks on-device with no evidenced data leaving the device.
    • Data Sharing: 75/100. Core banking transactions and account data are handled on Interbank-owned infrastructure. Six third-party SDKs may share behavioral, device, and session data with their respective vendors, as detailed in the Privacy Concerns section above.
    • User Control: 76/100. The build supports biometric authentication and provides an option to hide account balances. Data deletion can be requested per the Play Store listing.

    Positive Security Features

    • HTTPS is enforced across Interbank's network connections; cleartext traffic exceptions are not present in the build
    • App data backup is disabled, blocking backup-based data extraction
    • Biometric authentication is bound to hardware-backed secure storage on the device
    • Fifteen native library security checks resist hooking at the application layer
    • Runtime integrity monitoring polls at short intervals and terminates the process on failure
    • Core financial data (balances, transactions, card details) is processed on Interbank-owned infrastructure and not shared with analytics platforms
    • Google ML Kit processes text recognition, barcode scanning, and face detection on the device with no evidenced data egress
    • No advertising or ad-auction SDK is present in the build

    Areas for Improvement

    Disclosure observations

    Observations about disclosure, each stated against the published guidance so a reader can compare:

    1. Play Store Data Safety declaration
      The Play Store Data Safety section for this app, as retrieved on 2026-08-11, declares "No data shared with third parties." The analyzed build (version 23.1) initializes AppsFlyer, Adobe MobileCore, Microsoft Clarity, IBM Acoustic, ThreatMetrix TrustDefender, and IO SRO Collector at launch. Whether each SDK's data flows constitute "sharing" within Google Play's Data Safety definitions could not be determined from the binary alone. Google Play's Data Safety policy requires developers to declare data shared with third parties used for purposes beyond servicing the transaction; readers can compare that published requirement against the declared label.

    Security Enhancements

    1. Payment SDK build configuration
      The bundled IziPay payment SDK ships as a debug build variant with network validation disabled and a sandbox gateway configured. Replacing it with a production-signed release variant that restores network protections would close the gap for payment-flow traffic.

    2. Biometric component access control
      The biometric identity component in the build is accessible to other apps on the device without a permission requirement. Adding an explicit permission restriction would limit which applications can invoke it and reduce the risk of cross-app biometric data access.

    3. External link input handling
      The build accepts incoming URI parameters for payment and transfer flows without verifying the source. Checking the calling context before processing payment-related parameters would reduce the risk of misdirected transfers or payments.

    4. Development components in production
      The production build includes a diagnostics SDK (Adobe Experience Platform Assurance), a UI preview component, and a debug build variant of the payment SDK. Excluding development-only libraries from release builds is standard practice and reduces the accessible surface.

    Technical Context

    App Type: Mobile banking - high-sensitivity financial application
    Classes Analyzed: 3,200
    Third-Party Services: 20
    Context Tags: financial, sensitive_data, location, camera


    About This Analysis

    This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. The analysis is static code review of Android applications, intended to help people make informed decisions about app security and privacy.

    App Details

    Developer: Banco Internacional del Peru
    Version: 23.1 (Build 1843)
    Analysis Date: 2026-08-13
    Package: pe.com.interbank.mobilebanking

    Analysis Limitations

    • Static analysis only (code review without running the app)
    • Based on APK version 23.1 analyzed on 2026-08-13
    • May not reflect server-side security controls
    • Cannot detect all runtime behaviors

    Right of Reply

    Developer not yet contacted