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Can I trust Interbank APP?

unTRUSTED 64 Android Version 23.1 (versionCode 1843) Scanned build downloaded: Store version released: Last checked: pe.com.interbank.mobilebanking Scanned

This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.

What it means for you
Core financial data, including account balances, transactions, and card details, is processed on Interbank's own servers and is not passed to any analytics platform. The build includes code to pass install and usage data to services including Firebase Analytics, AppsFlyer, Adobe, and Microsoft Clarity. Camera-based features like barcode scanning use on-device processing with no data leaving the device.
Main concern
IziPay payment SDK ships debug build: SSL disabled, hardcoded key, test endpoint active
The developer's description
Mobile banking app from Interbank, a Peruvian financial institution. Provides account access, fund transfers, bill payment, peer-to-peer transfers via PLIN, card management, and biometric authentication.
Third-party services
20
Findings rated low or higher
11

How the score and the label work

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Full findings

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Trust checks

  • Secure by Design

    One criterion not met

    Security gaps detected

    Why this result

    This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.

  • Data Minimization

    One criterion not met

    Tracking lacks clear disclosure

    Why this result

    This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.

  • Manifest Mismatch

    An item rated high or above is open

    Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

    Why this result

    The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

  • User Control

    Strong

    No lock-in

    Why this result

    The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

    No evidence was found of proprietary data formats, technical barriers to account closure, or artificial obstacles to switching banks. Peruvian banking regulations require institutions to provide account closure pathways. The app imposes no additional lock-in beyond what is standard in the banking industry.

Red flags

  • The app's privacy declarations do not match its code

    Why this result

    The privacy declarations shipped in this build, or the ones on the store listing, state less than the code does. Declarations of this kind are what a store, a regulator and a person comparing two apps rely on.

Strengths

  • HTTPS enforced across all API endpoints with no cleartext traffic permitted anywhere in the app
  • App backup is disabled, blocking ADB and cloud backup data extraction attacks
  • Biometric authentication is bound to hardware-backed Android KeyStore keys — the strongest Android biometric pattern
  • 15 native JNI security checks resist Java-layer hooking and Frida bypass attempts
  • Continuous runtime integrity monitoring polls every 2–5 seconds and hard-kills the process on failure
  • Core financial data (account balances, transactions, card details) is processed exclusively on Interbank-owned servers and not shared with any analytics platform
  • Google ML Kit runs text recognition, barcode scanning, and face detection entirely on-device with no data leaving the device
  • No ad-serving or ad-targeting SDK is present — analytics and attribution SDKs collect install and behavioral data, not for ad auctions

What the app contains

  • 20 services

    Third-party services the scan names in the build:

    • IziPay Payment SDK
    • Thales TPC SDK
    • FacePhi Selphi
    • FacePhi SelphiD
    • ThreatMetrix TrustDefender (LexisNexis)
    • IO SRO Collector (unknown vendor)
    • Google Firebase (Analytics, Crashlytics, FCM, Remote Config)
    • AppsFlyer
    • Adobe Marketing Mobile (MobileCore)
    • Adobe Experience Platform Assurance
    • IBM Acoustic Mobile Push
    • Microsoft Clarity
    • Qualtrics
    • Dynatrace
    • AWS Cognito
    • Google ML Kit
    • Google Maps
    • Samsung Pay
    • Mastercard Sonic
    • Lottie (Airbnb)

Libraries

Libraries in the build of Interbank APP
LibraryVersionAdvisory
ExoPlayer / media3not recordednone confirmed
Roomnot recordednone confirmed
Lottienot recordednone confirmed
AppsFlyernot recordednone confirmed
Dynatracenot recordednone confirmed
Glidenot recordednone confirmed
Datatransportnot recordednone confirmed
Google Advertising ID clientnot recordednone confirmed
Google Sign-Innot recordednone confirmed
Google Play Servicesnot recordednone confirmed
Show all 29 libraries

Changes since the previous scan

  • Version 23.1 (versionCode 1843), score 64.
  • Score 38 before, 64 after.
  • Version 22.0 (Build 1799) before, 23.1 (versionCode 1843) after.
  • Score change since version 22.0 (Build 1799): +26 points.
  • Since the previous scan: 21 findings added, 11 removed.
  • Version 22.0 (Build 1799), score 38.
  • First public scan of this app.

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Build SHA-256
db996b5c9a60fe56e6e38a54fb4e860815a9541e6a9eb70d99720a762cf850cc
Rule pack
citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1
Files decompiled
48,969
Scan date
13 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.

Developer response

No response is published for this app.

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