Can I trust SAP for Me?
This scan is more than 90 days old. The store may list a newer version than the one described here.
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- The app includes code to send usage and interaction data to Firebase Analytics and Adobe Experience Platform for performance tracking, and to Qualtrics for optional in-app surveys. TrustArc consent management controls whether Adobe analytics tracking is active based on user preferences. Locally stored data is protected, and all traffic to company systems uses secure connections.
- Main concern
- The build includes code to send enterprise search queries verbatim to Adobe analytics servers
- The developer's description
- Interact with SAP anywhere, anytime. Track SAP system provisioning, manage support cases, monitor cloud system availability, and get immediate support from your device.
- Third-party services
- 28
- Findings rated low or higher
- 6
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
StrongStrong security foundation
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.
All stored data is encrypted using strong cryptography backed by Android's secure hardware. Network traffic uses HTTPS throughout with no plaintext exceptions, and no weakened certificate trust logic was found. The WebView bridge issue requires an attacker to first compromise the enterprise's own ServiceNow platform — that is an external precondition, not a flaw in this app. The hardcoded chat integration identifiers require an already-authenticated user session to misuse. No critical or high-severity security issues were found.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
Truly Local
One criterion not metContains code to send personal data off the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.
Strengths
- SQLCipher-encrypted storage with Android KeyStore root of trust for all sensitive state
- OAuth tokens stored exclusively in encrypted store, never in plain SharedPreferences
- android:allowBackup=false prevents ADB backup extraction
- Comprehensive logout clears all SharedPreferences, encrypted store entries, and session cookies
- All API traffic uses HTTPS with no cleartext exceptions in networkSecurityConfig
- No custom or weakened TrustManager — relies on system default trust logic
- No ALLOW_ALL HostnameVerifier found
- Mutual TLS support for certificate-based client authentication
- WebView URL allowlist validates all Intent-provided URLs before loading
- TrustArc consent management correctly disables Adobe analytics on consent revocation
What the app contains
28 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Crashlytics
- Firebase Analytics
- Firebase Messaging (FCM)
- Firebase Sessions
- Firebase ML Kit
- Adobe Experience Platform
- Adobe Edge
- Adobe Assurance
- ServiceNow NowChat
- ServiceNow NowSDK Web
- ServiceNow Cabrillo
- ServiceNow Voice
- ServiceNow Adaptive Auth
- TrustArc
- Qualtrics
- OkHttp3
- Retrofit2
- BouncyCastle
- jjwt
- SQLCipher
- Google Tink
- Room
- Dagger
- RxJava3
- Picasso
- Glide
- Logback/SLF4J
- SAP Mobile Foundation
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Room | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Glide | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Mobile Ads (AdMob) | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Sign-In | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Maps SDK | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Material Components | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Play Core | not recorded | none confirmed |
Show all 26 librariesShow fewer
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Files decompiled
- 42,879
- Scan date
- 13 June 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
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