Can I trust Expenses: Spending Tracker?

Trust checks

• Secure by Design

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Security gaps detected

  Why this result

  This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.

  The app stores its passcode in plain text in a file that is included in unencrypted device backups.

• Data Minimization

  ● Strong

  Tracking done right

  Why this result

  The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.

  The app contains no advertising networks, behavioral analytics platforms, or attribution trackers. No advertising identifier is read, and no user behavior is measured across apps. The sole third-party SDK is the Setapp subscription platform, which includes code to transmit anonymous app-health signals to its operator as a built-in feature of the distribution service the user subscribed to. There is no pre-consent tracking and no opt-out mechanism is needed because there is nothing to opt out of beyond the Setapp platform terms the user accepted.

• Manifest Mismatch

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

  Why this result

  The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

  The app's privacy declarations contain an internal contradiction about cross-app tracking, and third-party components collect device and usage data that appears incompletely represented in the developer's disclosures.

• User Control

  ● Strong

  No lock-in

  Why this result

  The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

  The app's financial data is stored in the user's own iCloud container, not on the developer's servers. There is no proprietary server-side database holding the user's records. Deleting the app removes the local copy, and the iCloud copy remains entirely under the user's own Apple account. Because the developer holds none of the user's data, there is no lock-in to escape.

• Truly Local

  ● Strong

  Stays on the device

  Why this result

  This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone. The check looks for any code written to send personal data to a server, including analytics, crash reporting and advertising code. None was recorded in this build.

  Expense records and financial summaries are stored on the device and, when sync is active, in the user's own iCloud account via Apple's CloudKit infrastructure. The developer has no access to a user's iCloud data. Receipt scanning runs entirely on the device using Apple's built-in vision engine. Any AI-assisted categorization uses Apple Intelligence, which processes data on the device without sending it to external servers. The only request contents built for a third party are anonymous app-health metrics addressed to the Setapp subscription platform; these contain no financial records.

What the app contains

• 1 service

  Third-party services the scan names in the build:

  • Setapp (MacPaw)

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Scan date

5 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.