Can I trust MOVAhome?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- Avoid if
- Users who avoid Chinese-owned analytics and ad services
- What it means for you
- Widget data is shared only within the developer's own systems, with no third-party access. Login session credentials are stored in the iOS Keychain rather than in plaintext. The build includes code to send usage and device data to analytics and advertising services from ByteDance, Umeng (Alibaba), Baidu, and Facebook.
- Main concern
- RSA private key in bundle enables forged hotfix code execution across all devices
- The developer's description
- App for controlling MOVA and Dreame brand robot vacuums and connected smart home devices. Features remote monitoring, automated scheduling, and cloud connectivity.
- Third-party services
- 20
- Findings rated low or higher
- 8
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
An item rated high or above is openSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
The app embeds server credentials, encryption secrets, and authorization keys inside the app itself. Its network encryption is implemented in a mode that makes the protected data predictable.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
This build contains code for this item; what that code does at run time was not observed.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
No evidence was found of artificial barriers to leaving the service. The app does not rely on proprietary data formats that would trap cleaning maps or device history in a way that prevents portability, and nothing in the code was found to obstruct account deletion or switching to another product. The primary value a user has invested in is the physical robot hardware, not a data silo created by the software alone.
Truly Local
One criterion not metContains code to send personal data off the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.
This build contains code for this item; what that code does at run time was not observed.
Strengths
- Login session tokens stored in iOS Keychain, not in plaintext files or UserDefaults
- Apple App Attest linked for device integrity verification against compromised clients
- ATT consent framework integrated to gate IDFA access before collection
- Widget data shared only within developer's own first-party App Group (Team ID 4SR4F9A37X — no third-party access)
- Firebase used only for crash reporting, not behavioral analytics or advertising
What the app contains
20 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Crashlytics
- ByteDance Rangers Analytics (BDAutoTrack)
- BDASignalSDK (ByteDance device signals)
- Facebook SDK
- Umeng Analytics (Alibaba)
- AWS Cognito
- AWS IoT
- Aliyun EMAS
- Google Sign-In
- AMap / Gaode Maps
- MMKV (Tencent)
- OpenInstall
- PayPal PPRiskMagnes
- Zendesk
- Baidu Mobile Ads
- Tencent IoT Explorer
- Agora (Real-time Video/Audio)
- FingerprintJS
- Tencent GVoice
- GetUI (gtads)
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| AFNetworking | 4.0.1 | none confirmed |
| Alamofire | 5.11.2 | none confirmed |
| Firebase Core | 11.13.0 | none confirmed |
| SDWebImage | 5.21.7 | none confirmed |
| ART | 0.61.5 | none confirmed |
| ASN1Decoder | 1.10.0 | none confirmed |
| ATAuthSDK | 2.12.15 | none confirmed |
| AWSAuthCore | 2.41.0 | none confirmed |
| AWSCognitoIdentityProvider | 2.41.0 | none confirmed |
| AWSCognitoIdentityProviderASF | 2.41.0 | none confirmed |
Show all 215 librariesShow fewer
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Scan date
- 4 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.