Microsoft 365 Copilot Security & Privacy Scorecard
Android
Usage and diagnostic data is collected via Microsoft 1DS and AppCenter telemetry, and install attribution is tracked through Klondike and Google Install Referrer. Authentication tokens are stored with strong device-level protection, and Firebase analytics is disabled. Microsoft Intune MAM support is available for organizations requiring managed device policies.
Best for
Microsoft 365 users managing work docs on mobile
Findings
- 0 critical
- 1 high
- 3 medium
- 2 low
- 0 info
2 issues identified across security and privacy analysis.
Top security issues
- MetaOS NestedAppAuth Bridge Registers WebMessageListener with Wildcard Origin
- Copilot AI Response Metadata Cached in Unencrypted SQLite Database
- Network Security Configuration Permits Cleartext HTTP Globally for All Domains
Top privacy issues
- Microsoft 1DS/Aria Telemetry SDK Transmits EUII-Classified Events Including Voice Session Data Without Confirmed Consent Gate
- Google Advertising ID (GAID) Collected for Install Attribution in Enterprise Productivity App
- Copilot AI Response Metadata Cached in Unencrypted SQLite Database
Full analysis
Microsoft 365 Copilot
What This Means for You
Your voice queries and Copilot chat sessions are tagged as containing personal information and customer content before being sent to Microsoft telemetry servers, and your device's advertising identifier is collected for install attribution without an in-app opt-out.
Recommendation: Acceptable for Enterprise Use
Enterprise users on managed Intune devices can use safely. Privacy-conscious users should be aware of telemetry collection and an authentication bridge security issue before installing. IT administrators should review whether advertising identifier collection aligns with organisational privacy policies.
Best For: Enterprise Microsoft 365 users on managed Intune devices where IT policy controls data handling
Key Findings
Data Security - 1 finding (1 medium)
Network Security - 2 findings (1 medium, 1 low)
Code Safety - 0 findings
Privacy - 2 findings (1 medium, 1 low)
Privacy Concerns
What Data is Collected
- Personal information: email address, name, account identifiers
- Device information: device model, manufacturer, OS version, screen resolution, locale, timezone, carrier country, network operator, persistent install identifier
- Usage data: app interactions, voice session events, Copilot chat metadata, AI-generated content metadata
- Advertising identifier: Google Advertising ID collected for install attribution (Limit Ad Tracking flag respected)
Third-Party Data Sharing
The following third parties may receive your data:
- Microsoft 1DS/Aria - telemetry and analytics, including voice session data classified as personal information and customer content
- Microsoft AppCenter - device diagnostics and analytics (carrier, model, locale, timezone, install UUID)
- Klondike Attribution (Microsoft) - install attribution using advertising identifier, install referrer URL, and click timestamps
- Google Install Referrer API - install source and referrer URL
- Firebase (FCM only) - push notifications only; analytics explicitly disabled
Understanding the Scores
Security: 92/100
Privacy: 91/100
Security Breakdown
- Data Security: 93/100 - Copilot session responses and authentication data are protected, though some AI response metadata written to local storage is not fully covered
- Network Security: 90/100 - All Microsoft cloud connections use secure transport; a global cleartext HTTP allowance remains for legacy on-premises server compatibility
- Code Safety: 100/100 - No unsafe code patterns identified across 15,000 classes analyzed
Privacy Breakdown
- Data Collection: 91/100 - Broad telemetry collection including voice data; advertising identifier used in an enterprise context with no standalone opt-out
- Data Sharing: 95/100 - Data sharing limited to Microsoft-owned services and standard platform APIs; no broad third-party advertising ecosystem
- User Control: 92/100 - Users can request data deletion and the app respects system-level ad tracking limits, but in-app telemetry controls are limited
Positive Security Features
- Authentication is handled through Microsoft's identity library with Azure AD, keeping sign-in flows within a well-audited platform
- Authentication data is protected using the device's hardware-backed secure storage
- Local device backup of app data is disabled, preventing sensitive content from appearing in unprotected phone backups
- All secure connections enforce strict error checking, rejecting invalid or untrusted server identities
- Enterprise-managed devices benefit from additional network traffic protection through Microsoft Intune management
- Firebase push notification infrastructure is used for notifications only; Firebase analytics are explicitly turned off
- AI inference for smart features runs on-device via Google ML Kit, meaning that data is not sent to external servers for processing
- FIDO2 hardware security key authentication is supported via Yubico, enabling strong phishing-resistant login for enterprise users
- The advertising identifier Limit Ad Tracking flag is respected, so users who have opted out system-wide are not tracked
Areas for Improvement
GDPR / CCPA Compliance
The app's privacy practices could be strengthened by:
Consent Gating for Telemetry
Telemetry collection, including voice session data classified as personal information, begins at app startup before any consent acknowledgement can be confirmed. Adding an explicit consent check before the first telemetry transmission would align with GDPR requirements for processing personal data.Advertising Identifier Use in Enterprise Context
The advertising identifier is collected for install attribution without an in-app mechanism to opt out independently of the system-wide ad tracking toggle. For an enterprise productivity app, organisations and privacy-conscious users should have a direct way to disable this collection.Full Coverage of Local AI Session Storage
Some Copilot session metadata stored locally - including document sensitivity labels and source document references - is not handled per security standards. Extending the same protection already applied to the main response content would reduce exposure on shared or compromised devices.
Security Enhancements
Restrict Authentication Bridge Origins
The in-app authentication bridge that handles Microsoft 365 sign-in flows within embedded pages accepts messages from any page origin. Restricting this to known Microsoft domains would prevent a compromised or malicious embedded page from triggering authentication flows.Scope Cleartext HTTP Permissions
The current configuration allows unencrypted HTTP connections to any host. Restricting this allowance to only the specific legacy on-premises server scenarios that require it would prevent accidental unencrypted data transmission in other contexts.
Technical Context
App Type: Enterprise AI productivity app (high sensitivity - handles work documents, emails, and voice input)
Classes Analyzed: 15,000
Third-Party Services: 24
Context Tags: enterprise, productivity, office, ai, documents, voice, cloud, ads
About This Analysis
This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. We perform static code analysis on Android applications to help users make informed decisions about app security and privacy.
App Details
Developer: Microsoft Corporation
Version: 16.0.19929.20060 (build 45158845)
Analysis Date: 2026-04-17
Package: com.microsoft.office.officehubrow
Analysis Limitations
- Static analysis only (code review without running the app)
- Based on APK version 16.0.19929.20060 analyzed on 2026-04-17
- May not reflect server-side security controls
- Cannot detect all runtime behaviors
Versions & scan history
| Scan | Date | Overall score |
|---|---|---|
| #1 (current) | 91/100 |