Can I trust Wagoneer?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- Avoid if
- Relying on public Wi-Fi for account access
- What it means for you
- Vehicle location, trip history, and account documents are kept encrypted on the device. The app includes code to send App activity and diagnostic data to Adobe, Firebase, Salesforce, and Facebook for analytics and marketing. Some account activity may be exposed with less protection than expected on public Wi-Fi.
- Main concern
- Production WebViews accept invalid TLS certs, exposing payment card data to network attackers
- The developer's description
- Wagoneer connected-car app by FCA. Enables remote vehicle operations (lock, unlock, start), access to service history and recalls, dealer scheduling, and entertainment services. Requires active subscription and equipped vehicle.
- Third-party services
- 23
- Findings rated low or higher
- 11
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Full findings
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Trust checks
Secure by Design
One criterion not metSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
Data Minimization
One criterion not metTracking lacks clear disclosure
Why this result
This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
No proprietary data formats that would trap user data, no artificial barriers to cancellation, and no obstacles to switching were found. The app uses standard account and vehicle data structures served through the manufacturer's connected-car platform.
Strengths
- Connections to FCA/Stellantis backend servers use certificate pinning with custom trust anchors, blocking network-level TLS interception for those domains
- Local vehicle and account data (location, trip history, glovebox documents, remote operation history) is encrypted at rest via SQLCipher with a randomly generated passphrase
- Vehicle list data is protected with EncryptedSharedPreferences using AndroidKeyStore-backed keys and properly managed encryption nonces
What the app contains
23 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Firebase Crashlytics
- Firebase Cloud Messaging
- Firebase Performance
- Firebase Remote Config
- Adobe Experience Platform Analytics
- Adobe Experience Platform Identity
- Adobe Experience Platform Signal
- Adobe Experience Platform Lifecycle
- Adobe Experience Platform UserProfile
- Adobe Assurance
- OneTrust
- SAP Gigya
- Salesforce Marketing Cloud
- Stellantis PIMS SDK
- Stellantis SmartphoneStation
- Stellantis CeaEasyApps / CD2
- XTN SEAP SDK
- DQUID SDK
- Facebook SDK
- OpenID AppAuth
- Eclipse Paho MQTT
- AWS IoT SDK
- Google Play Services / Measurement
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| ExoPlayer / media3 | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Room | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Lottie | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Facebook SDK | 12.1.0 | none confirmed |
| Glide | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Datatransport | not recorded | none confirmed |
| Google Advertising ID client | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Sign-In | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services | 12451000 | none confirmed |
| Google Play Services Location | 12451000 | none confirmed |
Show all 33 librariesShow fewer
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Build SHA-256
- 1bdd73df254d069afb1934a137e9bbe9a0e1f44492afaf7362dbde4de1118e75
- Rule pack
- citt-ruleset-2026-08-v1
- Files decompiled
- 29,249
- Scan date
- 15 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.