Can I trust Widgetsmith?

Trust checks

• Secure by Design

  ● Strong

  Strong security foundation

  Why this result

  This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.

  The app uses modern authenticated encryption and signs all connections with HTTPS enforced across every endpoint, with no exceptions carved out for any domain. Stack protection is compiled throughout the binary. The cryptographic primitives in use are current and appropriately chosen. Two genuine security weaknesses keep this from a clean pass. First, the widget theme import feature does not verify that files inside a .widgets or .theme archive land within the intended folder, meaning a crafted theme file delivered via email, AirDrop, or a share link could overwrite internal app data files. The impact is confined to the app's own storage space. Second, three paid weather and radar service credentials are embedded directly in the app binary, giving anyone who extracts them persistent authenticated access to those developer accounts. No critical or severe security issues were found, but these two real deficiencies prevent a clean result.

• Data Minimization

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Tracking lacks clear disclosure

  Why this result

  This build contains analytics or attribution code written to send data to companies other than the developer. No consent step was found before that code runs, and the app's disclosures do not describe the collection in full. Tracking by itself is ordinary; what this check reports is the combination of collection, recipient and absent disclosure.

  The app uses advertising data for ad targeting without presenting users with the consent prompt they would need to opt out.

• Manifest Mismatch

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

  Why this result

  The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

• User Control

  ● Strong

  No lock-in

  Why this result

  The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

  Widget configurations, custom themes, and settings live on the device. The app does not maintain a server-side library of user-created content that would require an export or deletion process. There is no user account to close. Deleting the app removes the data, and no proprietary server-side format creates any barrier to switching to another tool.

• Truly Local

  ● Strong

  Stays on the device

  Why this result

  This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone. The check looks for any code written to send personal data to a server, including analytics, crash reporting and advertising code. None was recorded in this build.

  Health, calendar, contacts, and reminders data are confirmed to remain on the device. The binary contains no network calls that include this personal information in a request. The only code that contains location data builds requests to weather service APIs for local weather conditions, for the weather widget types the user explicitly configures. The requests built for third-party services contain standard advertising identifiers, subscription status, and behavioral event names, none of which fall into the sensitive category of health, biometric, financial, or contact information.

What the app contains

• 10 services

  Third-party services the scan names in the build:

  • Google Mobile Ads (AdMob)
  • Google UMP (UserMessagingPlatform)
  • RevenueCat
  • Superwall
  • Lottie
  • Foreca
  • Weathermachine.io
  • WorldTides
  • Apple AdServices
  • Apple AdSupport / ATT

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Scan date

5 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.