Scan results

    CatLens - Cat Vision Filter

    Android

    CatLens transforms your phone camera into a scientifically accurate animal vision simulator. See through the eyes of 6 different animals including cats, dogs, and eagles—powered by real vision science and WebGL rendering.

    TRUSTish

    This app did not meet one of the trust checks in this assessment.

    The five trust checks

    Truly LocalNot applicable
    CITT SCORE
    86
    out of 100
    TRUSTish

    Quick Verdict

    Best for: Photo enthusiasts who want camera effects processed on

    Not For: Users who prefer ad-free apps

    What It Means For You

    Camera images and photo effects are processed locally on the device, with no photo or video frames routed to a cloud backend. Firebase is present for push notification delivery only, not behavioral tracking. Usage data and device identifiers are shared with Google AdMob for advertising and OneSignal for targeted notifications.

    Method and Limitations

    Static analysis only. CITT reviewed the code of this build without running the app, so runtime behavior was not observed. The findings below describe the analyzed build and may not reflect server-side controls or later versions. CITT makes no determination about compliance with any law or platform policy; it reports what the artifacts contain and cites the published guidance so a reader can compare.

    How CITT scores an app

    Findings (6)

    Data Security

    2 total
    2 Low

    Code Security

    3 total
    1 High
    2 Low

    Permission Usage

    1 total
    1 Low

    Third-Party Services

    Google AdMob, Firebase Cloud Messaging, Firebase Installations, Google ML Kit, OneSignal, RevenueCat, Google Play Billing, Amazon IAP, PairIP License Check, Expo EAS Updates, Apollo GraphQL

    Security Strengths

    • Network traffic uses standard TLS with no SSL bypass — connections cannot be intercepted by a network attacker
    • Sensitive secrets are stored with AES-256-GCM encryption backed by the hardware-bound Android KeyStore
    • Camera images are processed on the device — no evidence of photos or video frames being transmitted to a cloud backend
    • No session recording or screen capture SDKs are present — the screen is not being observed by analytics vendors
    • Firebase is used only for push notification delivery, not behavioral analytics or ad tracking
    What changed since the last scan

    Version diff is on the Developer plan. See developer plans.

    Context Tags

    camera
    ads

    Package

    com.codixus.catlens.app

    Version

    1.5.0 (versionCode 15)

    Analysis Date

    Aug 26, 2026

    Classes Analyzed

    34,843

    Was this analysis helpful?

    Feedback helps us improve our analysis

    View on Play Store

    Recommendation: TRUSTED

    CITT rates this build at 86/100. Camera effects are computed on-device, all network connections use standard TLS, and no behavioral analytics or session-recording SDKs are present. The over-the-air JavaScript update mechanism checks for updates on every launch; developer code signing is not applied to those bundles in this build, which is the primary area for the developer to address.

    Key Findings

    Data Security: 2 findings (2 low)

    Network Security: 0 findings

    Code Safety: 3 findings (1 high, 2 low)

    Privacy: 1 finding (1 low)

    Privacy Concerns

    What Leaves the Device

    • Device advertising identifier and app activity data: shared with Google AdMob for ad delivery, consistent with the Play Store data safety disclosure (retrieved 2026-08-26)
    • Device identifiers registered for push notifications: shared with Firebase Cloud Messaging and OneSignal to deliver push notifications
    • Device installation identifiers: shared with Firebase Installations for service registration
    • Subscription and purchase state: shared with RevenueCat, Google Play Billing, and Amazon IAP to manage in-app entitlements
    • JavaScript bundle update requests: made to Expo EAS update servers on each app launch

    What Stays on the Device

    • Camera images and video frames: processed on-device via WebGL shaders; no network transmission path for photo or video data was identified in this build, meaning camera output stays under the user's control.

    Third-Party Data Sharing

    Third parties that may receive data from the app:

    • Google AdMob - Advertising delivery and targeting
    • Firebase Cloud Messaging - Push notification delivery
    • Firebase Installations - Device registration for Firebase services
    • OneSignal - Push notification delivery
    • RevenueCat - In-app subscription and purchase management
    • Google Play Billing - In-app purchase processing
    • Amazon IAP - In-app purchase processing
    • Expo EAS Updates - Over-the-air JavaScript bundle delivery
    • PairIP - License verification

    Understanding the Scores

    Security: 85/100
    Privacy: 90/100

    Security Breakdown

    • Data Security: 88/100. Sensitive data is protected using hardware-backed encryption. Two low-severity configuration items are noted in Areas for Improvement.
    • Network Security: 100/100. All network connections use standard TLS; no weakened or bypassed configuration was identified in this build.
    • Code Safety: 88/100. Hardware-backed secret storage is implemented correctly. The over-the-air update mechanism does not apply developer code signing to received bundles in this build; this is noted in Areas for Improvement.

    Privacy Breakdown

    • Data Collection: 92/100. Camera and video processing stays on the device. Device advertising identifiers and app activity signals are shared with advertising services, consistent with the Play Store data safety disclosure.
    • Data Sharing: 95/100. Data shared off the device is limited to advertising, push notification, subscription management, and license services that are functional to the app's operation.
    • User Control: 92/100. Standard Android permission controls govern camera and storage access. The advertising identifier may be reset or removed through Android's privacy settings.

    Positive Security Features

    • All network connections use standard TLS; no weakened or bypassed configuration was identified in this build.
    • Camera images and video frames are processed on-device; no network transmission path for photo or video data was identified in this build.
    • Sensitive secrets are stored using hardware-backed encryption provided by the Android KeyStore.
    • Firebase is linked for push notification delivery only; no behavioral analytics or session-recording use was identified for Firebase in this build.
    • No session-recording or screen-observation SDKs are present in this build.

    Areas for Improvement

    Disclosure observations

    Observations about disclosure, each stated against the published guidance so a reader can compare:

    1. Advertising Consent Ordering
      The Play Store data safety section (retrieved 2026-08-26) declares that device identifiers may be shared with third parties and that data cannot be deleted. The build links Google AdMob. Whether advertising consent is requested before the advertising identifier is read is determined at the JavaScript runtime layer and was not statically verifiable from this build alone.

    Security Enhancements

    1. Over-the-Air Update Code Signing
      The build includes Expo's code signing infrastructure but no developer certificate is configured, so JavaScript bundles received from Expo's update servers are accepted based on the TLS channel alone. Enabling Expo's code signing with a developer certificate would add a cryptographic check that each update originated from the developer's own account.

    2. Android Backup Scope
      Two backup exclusion rule files are present in the APK but are not referenced in the manifest, so Android backs up all app data without restriction. Wiring these files to the manifest's backup rule attributes would limit what app data is included in device backups.

    3. Production Build Cleanup
      The production build includes a file-sharing path scoped to the full external storage root rather than a specific directory, a development tool activity marked as externally accessible, and a local development server address in the resource strings. Scoping the file-sharing path to the intended directory, removing the development activity's external accessibility flag, and cleaning the resource string would reduce the build's surface area.

    Technical Context

    App Type: Entertainment - Real-time camera filter and animal vision simulator
    Classes Analyzed: 34,843
    Third-Party Services: 11
    Context Tags: camera, ads


    About This Analysis

    This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. The analysis is static code review of Android applications, intended to help people make informed decisions about app security and privacy.

    App Details

    Developer: Codixus (Metehan Kurucu)
    Version: 1.5.0 (Build 15)
    Analysis Date: 2026-08-26
    Package: com.codixus.catlens.app

    Analysis Limitations

    • Static analysis only (code review without running the app)
    • Based on APK version 1.5.0 analyzed on 2026-08-26
    • May not reflect server-side security controls
    • Cannot detect all runtime behaviors

    Right of Reply

    Developer not yet contacted