Booking.com's official travel app for searching and booking accommodations, flights, and related travel services worldwide.
Quick Verdict
Best for: Travelers comfortable with standard analytics
What It Means For You
Booking activity, device identifiers, and behavioral signals are shared with AppsFlyer, Firebase Crashlytics, Google AdMob, and Embrace for analytics, crash reporting, and advertising. Payment data flows through Stripe, Klarna, PayPal, Adyen, and fraud-detection services including FingerprintPro and Riskified. Analytics and ad signals are gated behind consent via OneTrust before being activated.
Quick Verdict
Best for: Travelers comfortable with standard analytics
What It Means For You
Booking activity, device identifiers, and behavioral signals are shared with AppsFlyer, Firebase Crashlytics, Google AdMob, and Embrace for analytics, crash reporting, and advertising. Payment data flows through Stripe, Klarna, PayPal, Adyen, and fraud-detection services including FingerprintPro and Riskified. Analytics and ad signals are gated behind consent via OneTrust before being activated.
Method and Limitations
Static analysis only. CITT reviewed the code of this build without running the app, so runtime behavior was not observed. The findings below describe the analyzed build and may not reflect server-side controls or later versions. CITT makes no determination about compliance with any law or platform policy; it reports what the artifacts contain and cites the published guidance so a reader can compare.
Data Security
2 totalNetwork Security
4 totalCode Security
4 totalPrivacy
4 totalThird-Party Risk
4 totalVersion diff is on the Developer plan. See developer plans.
Context Tags
Package
com.booking.BookingApp
Version
65.4 (Build 65.4.2453304889)
Analysis Date
Apr 18, 2026
Classes Analyzed
29
Feedback helps us improve our analysis
Booking uses biometric security and HTTPS for primary endpoints, but some cached data (messages, GraphQL responses) lacks encryption. Users should know their precise location and device identity are shared with fraud analytics vendors.
Data Security - 2 findings (2 medium)
Network Security - 5 findings (3 medium, 2 low)
Code Safety - 5 findings (1 medium, 3 low, 1 info)
Privacy - 6 findings (1 medium, 2 low, 3 info)
The following third parties may receive your data:
Security: 88/100
Privacy: 87/100
The app's privacy practices could be strengthened by:
Riskified Precise Location Disclosure
Users are not prominently informed that a fraud analytics vendor receives their precise GPS location linked to their identity. Clearer disclosure of this practice in the privacy policy and consent flow would strengthen transparency.
App Store Privacy Nutrition Label Completeness
The app's privacy manifest does not include declarations for first-party data collection and tracking status, which may leave the App Store privacy label incomplete. Completing these declarations would give users a more accurate picture before installing.
Analytics Consent Signal Consistency
A configuration flag enabling data upload to server-side analytics containers appears active alongside consent flags that disable client-side analytics collection. Aligning these flags ensures users who decline analytics are fully opted out across all collection paths.
On-Device Cache Encryption
Conversation messages and travel data cached on-device use a weaker protection class that leaves them readable after the first device unlock. Applying stronger file protection to these caches would reduce exposure on physically compromised devices.
Development Configuration Cleanup
Several development-only configurations (internal server hostnames, localhost telemetry endpoints, a test URL scheme) remain in the production binary. Removing these before App Store submission reduces the attack surface and improves build hygiene.
Klarna Payment Bridge Message Validation
The embedded Klarna payment component's JavaScript bridge accepts cross-window messages without validating the sending origin. Adding origin validation to this bridge would prevent cross-frame interference with the payment flow.
App Type: Travel commerce platform with payment processing, identity verification, and fraud detection - high sensitivity
Classes Analyzed: 29
Third-Party Services: 26 identified
Context Tags: travel, financial, location, sensitive_data, ads, biometric, identity_verification
This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. We perform static code analysis on iOS applications to help users make informed decisions about app security and privacy.
Developer: Booking.com B.V.
Version: 65.4 (Build 65.4.2453304889)
Analysis Date: 2026-04-18
Package: com.booking.BookingApp
Developer not yet contacted