Scan results

Recommendation: Trustworthy

CITT rates FitWoody Trustworthy. The app enforces HTTPS globally, avoids ad networks, keeps fitness data on-device, and uses privacy-preserving analytics. Local database encryption gaps represent its main technical concern.

Key Findings

Data Security: 0 findings

Network Security: 0 findings

Code Safety: 1 finding (1 low)

Privacy: 1 finding (1 low)

Privacy Concerns

What Leaves the Device

• Analytics events: Customer.io is linked in the binary and may send lifecycle and screen events to Customer.io servers; EU data residency is configured.
• Analytics telemetry: TelemetryDeck is linked and may send usage events using privacy-preserving, daily-rotating anonymized identifiers rather than persistent advertising IDs.
• Attribution data: RevenueCat is linked and may send an Apple Search Ads attribution identifier on install to identify install source; no persistent advertising identifier framework for cross-app targeting is linked in this binary.
• Workout sync data: PowerSync is linked for offline sync to the developer's own backend at fitwoody.camp.

What Stays on the Device

• Workout data, GPS routes, and health metrics read from Apple Health remain on the device and were not observed leaving it in this build.

Third-Party Data Sharing

Third parties that may receive data from the app:

• Customer.io - lifecycle analytics and in-app messaging (EU data residency configured)
• TelemetryDeck - privacy-preserving analytics using anonymized, rotating identifiers
• RevenueCat - subscription management and Apple Search Ads attribution
• Diagnostics SDK - diagnostics and crash reporting

Understanding the Scores

Security: 90/100
Privacy: 88/100

Security Breakdown

• Data Security: 83/100. Data handling practices are generally solid. The main opportunity for improvement is adding encryption at rest to the local offline-sync database.
• Network Security: 100/100. All network traffic uses HTTPS with no cleartext exceptions configured across any app target, representing the highest standard for transport security.
• Code Safety: 93/100. The binary links modern encryption algorithms throughout, representing a strong code safety profile.

Privacy Breakdown

• Data Collection: 85/100. Analytics and attribution data may leave the device to third-party services, while workout and health data read from Apple Health stays on the device.
• Data Sharing: 91/100. Data shared externally is limited to analytics, subscription management, and attribution. No advertising networks or data brokers are linked in the binary.
• User Control: 87/100. Sign in with Apple and passkey support give users strong, modern authentication options, and no persistent advertising identifier framework for cross-app ad targeting is linked in the binary.

Positive Security Features

• Workout data, GPS routes, and health metrics read from Apple Health stay on the device, with no evidence of transmission to any analytics, advertising, or data-broker endpoint in this build.
• No advertising networks or data broker SDKs are present in the binary.
• All network connections use HTTPS with no cleartext traffic exceptions in any app target.
• Sign in with Apple, passkey support, and OAuth session handling represent a modern authentication approach.
• TelemetryDeck analytics use daily-rotating anonymized identifiers, avoiding persistent advertising identifiers.
• Customer.io is configured with EU data residency.
• Backend sync runs on developer-controlled infrastructure (fitwoody.camp), not a third-party data custody service.

Areas for Improvement

Disclosure observations

1. App Privacy Manifest Coverage
   Apple's guidelines recommend that apps using required-reason APIs declare them in an app privacy manifest (PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy). The FitWoody binary links Customer.io and TelemetryDeck, both of which use APIs in Apple's required-reason category; a privacy manifest for the main app target was not identified in this build. Adding one could make the App Store privacy label more complete and consistent with the binary's linked frameworks.

Security Enhancements

1. Local Database Encryption
   The PowerSync SQLite database used for offline workout sync does not appear to have encryption at rest configured in this build. Enabling database encryption would protect stored workout data if a device is accessed without authorization.

2. URL Scheme Hardening
   The binary registers a custom URL scheme. Configuring Universal Links alongside the custom scheme would provide additional protection against URL scheme interception on shared devices.

Technical Context

App Type: Health and fitness, subscription, HealthKit integration
Classes Analyzed: 0 (iOS binary; static symbol and framework analysis)
Third-Party Services: 7
Context Tags: health, fitness, location, analytics, subscription

About This Analysis

This security analysis was conducted by CITT (Can I Trust That), an independent security analysis service. The analysis is static code review of iOS applications, intended to help people make informed decisions about app security and privacy.

App Details

Developer: FitWoody
Version: 2.6.5 (Build 463)
Analysis Date: 2026-08-13
Package: camp.FitWoody

Analysis Limitations

• Static analysis only (code review without running the app)
• Based on iOS build 2.6.5 (Build 463) analyzed on 2026-08-13
• May not reflect server-side security controls
• Cannot detect all runtime behaviors