Can I trust FitWoody Recovery & Readiness?

Trust checks

• Secure by Design

  ● Strong

  Strong security foundation

  Why this result

  This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and none were recorded. Its scope covers stored credentials, how the app protects data on the device, and how it protects data in transit.

  The app imports deprecated MD5 and SHA-1 hash algorithms from Apple's own cryptography library alongside modern, secure alternatives such as SHA-256 and authenticated encryption. The app also lacks certificate pinning for its health-data sync connections, meaning a network attacker who has installed a trusted certificate authority on the device could intercept that traffic. On the positive side, all connections are required to use HTTPS with no exceptions, the authentication stack uses Apple Sign-In and passkeys, no hardcoded secrets were found beyond a standard client-side publishable key, and no critical or high-severity security defects were identified.

• Data Minimization

  ● Strong

  Tracking done right

  Why this result

  The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.

  Customer.io automatic screen-view tracking and lifecycle event collection are confirmed active in the app, which includes code to send navigation patterns to Customer.io's servers as the user moves through the app. The advertising identifier is not accessed, so no consent prompt under Apple's App Tracking Transparency framework is required or relevant. TelemetryDeck, the other analytics service present, uses daily-rotating hashed identifiers that do not directly identify the user.

• Manifest Mismatch

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

  Why this result

  The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

• User Control

  ● Strong

  No lock-in

  Why this result

  The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

  The app uses standard, open-source backend infrastructure and stores data in a standard database format. Health data managed through Apple's HealthKit remains in the Apple Health store, which users can access and export through Apple Health. No proprietary data formats, artificial export barriers, or obstacles to switching services were detected.

What the app contains

• 7 services

  Third-party services the scan names in the build:

  • Customer.io (CioDataPipelines, CioMessagingPushAPN, CioMessagingInApp)
  • TelemetryDeck
  • RevenueCat
  • PowerSync
  • Supabase
  • AdServices (Apple — attribution only)
  • Diagnostics SDK

Changes since the previous scan

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Scan date

13 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.