Can I trust Tripsy: Travel Planner?
This app did not meet two or more trust checks, has a critical issue in one, or has a red flag.
- What it means for you
- Trip content, itineraries, and booking details are not shared with advertisers, data brokers, or cross-app tracking systems. AI-assisted features, including email parsing and itinerary suggestions, run entirely on the device. The build includes Mixpanel and Sentry code that reads usage and crash data to support app performance.
- Main concern
- ATS exception removes HTTPS enforcement for all production API subdomains on a travel app
- The developer's description
- Tripsy is a comprehensive travel planner that helps organize itineraries, flights, accommodations, activities, and travel documents in one clean, ad-free app with AI-powered suggestions.
- Third-party services
- 11
- Findings rated low or higher
- 3
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Full findings
Open this scan in your dashboardThe account that ran this scan sees every finding and the Rescan button there.
Trust checks
Secure by Design
Items recorded, result pending reviewSecurity gaps detected
Why this result
This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.
The app's network security settings disable the operating system's built-in protection against unencrypted connections to the developer's own servers, though no unencrypted traffic was confirmed in practice.
Data Minimization
StrongTracking done right
Why this result
The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.
The app contains no advertising networks and does not access the cross-app advertising identifier. The only analytics layer is a product analytics service used to measure how users interact with the app. The developer wrote custom code to manage how and when that service initializes, which suggests awareness of consent timing. The analytics service does, however, default to collecting data from first launch unless the developer explicitly overrides that default. This creates a genuine split: the developer's architecture points toward careful timing, while the default behavior of the analytics service would mean data collection before any consent step.
Manifest Mismatch
One criterion not metDisclosure incomplete or contradicted
Why this result
The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.
The app is missing a required privacy declaration file even though its code directly accesses device storage. A screen recording capability is compiled into the app with no disclosure about whether it is active.
User Control
StrongNo lock-in
Why this result
The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.
The app exports trip data using the iCalendar format, a widely supported open standard compatible with calendar and travel apps from other providers. No proprietary data formats that would trap a user's trip information were found. No artificial barriers to switching services or deleting an account were present in the code.
Truly Local
One criterion not metContains code to send personal data off the device
Why this result
This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone, and this build contains code written to send personal data to servers. The check covers analytics, crash reporting, advertising code and any first-party endpoint the code addresses personal data to. Code of this kind is common; what this check reports is the distance between that code and how the app describes itself.
That data does not appear to reach advertising networks or data brokers.
Strengths
- Trip content, itineraries, and booking data are not shared with advertisers, data brokers, or cross-app tracking systems
- No advertising networks or cross-app tracking SDKs are present
- AI-assisted features (email parsing, itinerary suggestions) run entirely on the device via Apple FoundationModels — no data sent to external AI APIs
- OAuth authorization flows use ASWebAuthenticationSession, preventing URL scheme hijacking of the token handoff
- No JavaScript-to-native bridge in WebViews, minimizing web-based attack surface
- Traffic to all active API endpoints uses HTTPS in code
What the app contains
11 services
Third-party services the scan names in the build:
- Sentry
- Mixpanel
- Setapp
- Kingfisher
- ASATools
- TripIt OAuth
- Unsplash
- Cloudinary
- WeatherKit
- FoundationModels
- CarPlay
Libraries
| Library | Version | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Sentry | 9.22.0 | none confirmed |
| Tripsy | not recorded | none confirmed |
Method and limits
Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.
- Scan date
- 5 August 2026
Corrections
No correction is published for this app.
Developer response
No response is published for this app.
Report an error Opens an email to [email protected] that names this app and this scan.