Can I trust Reflect Notes?

Trust checks

• Secure by Design

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Security gaps detected

  Why this result

  This check looks for security issues at high severity or above in the code of this build, and at least one was recorded. Issues of this kind include a credential or token another app on the device can reach, sensitive data stored without protection, and network paths that expose information in transit.

• Data Minimization

  ● Strong

  Tracking done right

  Why this result

  The check looks at analytics and attribution code for companies other than the developer: the data it reads, the companies named in code as recipients, and whether a consent step runs before that code. In this build, either no such code was recorded, or a consent step runs before it and the app's own disclosures describe the collection.

  The app contains no advertising networks, behavioral analytics platforms, or install-attribution SDKs. Google Analytics code is present in the JavaScript bundle due to the build toolchain but is never initialized in the app's code. The app does not collect or use Apple's Advertising Identifier and has no ATT tracking consent prompt. The only external telemetry is crash and performance reporting through Sentry, which is an error monitoring service rather than a behavioral tracking or advertising system. No pre-consent data collection to advertising or analytics services was found.

• Manifest Mismatch

  ◐ One criterion not met

  Disclosure incomplete or contradicted

  Why this result

  The check compares the app's privacy disclosures against what the code does, and at least one claim did not match in this build. Mismatches of this kind include a data category collected but not disclosed, a recipient the disclosure omits, and an identifier attached to data the disclosure describes as anonymous.

• User Control

  ● Strong

  No lock-in

  Why this result

  The check looks for a way to export the data an account has accumulated and a way to delete the account itself. In this build, either both were found, or the app has no account of its own and keeps its data on the device. For an app without an account, the developer has no server-side copy to export or delete, and deleting the app removes the data in its own storage.

  The app bundles ZIPFoundation, a library for creating compressed archives, which indicates note export functionality is part of the app. No proprietary data formats that would trap user content were identified. The cloud backend uses standard Firebase infrastructure. No artificial barriers to account deletion or service switching were detected in the available code.

• Truly Local

  ● Strong

  Stays on the device

  Why this result

  This app presents itself as working offline or on the device alone. The check looks for any code written to send personal data to a server, including analytics, crash reporting and advertising code. None was recorded in this build.

  The code encrypts notes synced to the cloud at the application layer using AES-GCM cryptography before handing them to the sync code, and the infrastructure for end-to-end encryption of synced content is present. However, the app stores encryption-related key material in Firestore, the same cloud service used for note storage. This introduces genuine uncertainty about whether the developer's servers could access the plaintext of stored notes. The app includes code to send user email addresses and account identifiers to Sentry for error reporting, though email is not classified as sensitive health, financial, or biometric data for this stamp.

What the app contains

• 13 services

  Third-party services the scan names in the build:

  • Firebase Auth
  • Firebase Realtime Database
  • Firebase Storage
  • Firebase Dynamic Links
  • Google Sign-In
  • Sentry
  • AppAuth
  • GTMAppAuth
  • GTMSessionFetcher
  • SQLCipher
  • Logflare
  • Capacitor
  • RecaptchaInterop

Method and limits

Static analysis: the decompiled code, manifest and resources of this build, read file by file. Network traffic at run time is established by a capture of the running app.

Files decompiled

395

Scan date

6 August 2026

Corrections

No correction is published for this app.